Landscape of Paradoxes

The Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Philosophy in Culture, Environment and Sustainability

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Blindern, Norway

11.06.2010

1. Introduction

1.1 Preface

A picture appeared on the front page of the Norwegian development monthly, Bistandsaktuelt, entitled: "Woodlanders with money"[1]. The image is of three men walking on a path surrounded by forest. In the middle we see the Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg flanked by the Norwegian Minster of Environment and Development, Erik Solheim, and the Brazilian Minister of Environment, Carlos Minc. They all look happy, relaxed and satisfied. The photographer's choice of moment of exposure creates an illusion which is hard to refrain from commenting on; that is, how the three men appear to be holding

[1] My own english translation: Bistandsaktuelt nr 7 - 2009.

hands. The picture may be symbolic of some form of shared unity between the three ministers and between the countries of Brazil and Norway.

The picture is shot on the 17th of September 2008 during the ministers' stay in Latin America. The visit to the rainforest was made because of the newly launched Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative where Brazil is one of the key partners. During the same visit, Stoltenberg opened a Norwegian pavilion at an oil/gas exhibition (Rio Oil and Gas), opened a Norwegian-Brazilian offshore seminar, took part in an event focusing on Norwegian "klippfisk" (dry and salted cod) and marked the 25 years jubilee of Norwegian support to indigenous development[2]. His schedule illustrates in many ways the main interests in the Norwegian-Brazilian relationship: oil and gas, development aid, trade, and now the recently added rainforest through the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative.

Almost two years after this ministerial promenade in May 2010, Oslo and Norway are currently the focus of international climate and forest attention. The Norwegian involvement for a global good has been manifested in the Oslo Climate and Forest Conference. In less than three years, the rainforest has become a number one concern in the Norwegian climate and development policy. This swift evolution of importance and the huge dimensions of the projects call for some questions.

[2] http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/smk/statsministerens-kontor/statsminister_jens_stoltenberg/kalender.html?id=434566

1.2 The research questions

How did Stoltenberg and Solheim end up in the middle of the Amazonian rainforest? And how did the rainforest suddenly appear as a crucial and important part of Norwegian development aid, as well as the relationship between Norway and the global south? As the Director General in NORAD, Poul Engeberg-Pedersen pointed out at a climate and forest seminar in October 2007, in the course of a few years, 2007-2010, the protection of rainforest has become one of the most interesting elements in Norwegian development policy. What has actually happened and what sort of dynamics is unfolding itself in the process of implementing the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative? Why did the rainforest appear as an attractive idea for Norway and other actors? And are there some elements in this Norwegian narrative about climate and rainforest that are neglected? My principal idea is that I, through a deeper understanding of this process, will also be confronted with some of the deeper and more general features of Norwegian climate and development policies.

With this in mind, I have interviewed different actors involved in the initiative, as well as bureaucrats, NGO activists and researchers. These interviews, together with the use of literature, an analysis of official documents and publications and some elements of the observational approach will hopefully give me some answers to how and why Stoltenberg and Solheim suddenly appeared in the Amazonian rainforest.

1.3 Rationale for my thesis

My interest in this topic has evolved out of an overall interest in development policy and how Norway relates to the world through different development initiatives and how these are talked about, explained and understood in a Norwegian political context. I was therefore in search of a case study which could reveal this relationship. The Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative was then a somewhat ideal case to investigate. Because I was not interested in this out of a genuine interest in deforestation issues or the climate threat, I therefore encountered two almost new areas for me to investigate with new knowledge that had to be gained. My theoretical framework is therefore to some extent dominated by development theory, but my aim is to show that by using critical development theory, certain important aspects of this initiative can be revealed - aspects which are often obscured in the principal speech about the initiative. I add to this a presentation of different narratives and discourses that have dominated in environmental development.

My interest in Norwegian development policy leads me to also include a discussion on how this policy is connected to a constructed self-image of Norway as a small and altruistic actor in the global landscape of development. The discrepancies in Norway's image are an important backdrop for a deeper understanding of Norwegian involvement. Once more, there are elements that are obscured which have to be taken into account.

My research is concentrated on interviews with Norwegian actors. How they think, act and experience the initative is central for my thesis. This has provided me with valuable information about the initiative; how it has evolved since 2007,

which events have been important, who are the involved actors and what sort of reaction a huge initiative like this has induced among the involved parties. What surprised me most in this process was the contrast between the political leaders' reasoning and the bureaucrats working on implementing the plans behind the rhetoric.

2. Methodology

I will use a multiple methodological approach, but my main tool will be qualitative, in-depth and open-ended interviews with a selection of key informants. This will, nevertheless, be supplemented by complementary methods such as an observational approach “in the field” and a more text based approach.

2.1 My informants

My focus area or field is the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative and the people and institutions working directly and indirectly with this initiative. I have interviewed bureaucrats in The Norwegian Agency of Development Cooperation (NORAD), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD), the Ministry of Environment (MD), NGO representatives from Rainforest Foundation Norway (RFN), Friends of the Earth Norway, Greenpeace Norway and been in e-mail contact with the editor in charge of the REDD-monitor blog. I have also had further conversational interviews with different scientists involved in some way or another in REDD related research at the Department of International Environment and Development (NORAGRIC) and the Department of Economics and Resource Management at the Norwegian University of Life Science (UMB), the Centre for International Climate Environmental Research- Oslo (CICERO) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

2.2 Why interview?

The first question that surfaced after choosing the Norwegian REDD initiative as a research topic was what methodological approach I should settle on. My

decision about doing my research at a policy level in Norway, and among Norwegian REDD actors, made it natural to focus on the qualitative interview as my main strategy. My main object of study is the different actors' plans and ideas about what they are doing. Interviews can reveal particular insights into the different informants' experiences, ideas and thoughts about the Norwegian REDD-initiative. There are, however, contrasting viewpoints regarding to which extent interviews can reveal "truths" about the world. A positivistic approach would say that the informant description of reality is correct and the researcher is only seen as neutral mediator of this told truth. The opposite approach, constructivism, would argue that the information you get from your informant is context bound and is only created in a space/time specific relation between informant and interviewer. Real experiences from the world outside of the interview situation are therefore not unaffectedly and neutrally transferred in an interview (Thagaard 2006:83). An interview can therefore not give you valid data about the reality, and answers can vary as a result of differing contexts, as well as through the way in which the informants perceive the interviewer. In this landscape between positivism and constructivism we are in need of a middle ground. Thagaard (2006) argues that it is possible to acknowledge both that data collected through interviews offers more or less true descriptions about the informants' lives, but is also, at the same time, a reflection of how the informants understand their own experiences and how the interaction occurs in the interview situation.

Based on experiences from different interviews with a wide range of informants I can of course find examples on informant-interviewer relations that have worked better than others, but for my type of research, this has not changed my findings significantly. The fact that my research topic is more or less only related to the professional and impersonal life of my informants make these objections

less relevant for my data collection. The data I am asking for in my interviews concentrates on the professional lives of my informants, not their private lives, and it is therefore perhaps more neutral and less influenced by the interview setting or the relation between the two of us. It is, of course, difficult to draw a line between the private and professional life, but I believe a constructivist argument is more valid when the interview topics are more related to the personal life of the informant than a more abstract topic such as the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative.

2.3 Challenges related to using interviews

With this in mind, it is not to say that there are no challenges related to the use of the interview as a method in this field. Terje Tvedt (2003), one of the most important researchers on Norwegian development policy, claims that to use interviews as a method in this field has several drawbacks. One of them is that theNorwegian development system's descriptions of itself are so dominating that the individual actors will have difficulties to talk beyond the system's own language. He also sees great difficulties in moving beyond the rhetorical grip of the system; such as how, for example, the use of phrases like "we have learned" and "we were stupid before" are making their current decisions, actions and ideas more valid. Tvedt, who likes to invent new terms, calls this "contemporary imperialism" (Tvedt 2003:323).

In addition to this, the bureaucratic language can create some conversational obstacles. It is, for example, difficult to get valid data about what an informant thinks about certain matters if she only talks in general terms. Here interviews can be in danger of producing uninteresting data. I will nevertheless argue that

their statements can be very useful for my research. Despite their use of vague and bureaucratic language, my informants' statements have presented many interesting and revealing representations on how this system thinks, works and interacts within itself, within the Norwegian society and in its contact with the rest of the world. It is also notable how I have often met bureaucrats who actually were allowing themselves to think more freely than others.

My aim is that through a selection of key-informants both inside and outside the Climate and Forest Initiative I will be able to transcend the language of the system and also maintain a nuanced and perhaps critical approach to it. It is also important to remember that, even though the dominant Norwegian development language influences my informants, their statements can provide evidence on the way in which different stakeholders express themselves and think about the initiative. Perhaps it is exactly their way of talking and their understanding that I am searching for? With this in mind, I believe that interviews are a good method to use in this context. My use of observation and text analysis will also complement the interviews in the research. In this way I can triangulate my field of study.

2.4 Observation

I have, as mentioned above, also made some observations throughout my research period. I have participated in seminars and meetings related to the initiative and the stakeholders whenever possible. The way people talk, interact, and resolve disagreements and put forward different ideas and scenarios has been very useful for me. I have, through this, gained a deeper understanding of different aspects of the initiative.

I have been taking part in and observed on a one-day REDD seminar. This was arranged by NORAD where the different ministries took part as well as the NGOs, media and research institutions. In the end of my data collecting period I took part in an afternoon seminar also arranged by NORAD, where Arild Angelsen from UMB presented his new edited book on REDD published by The Center of International Forestry Research (CIFOR). Interestingly enough, several of my informants from the bureaucracy were participating and discussing REDD openly. This somehow coincidental experience ended up being very fruitful for my data collection. I have also been participating in several academic seminars where important Norwegian and international researchers have discussed REDD related issues. This has also been very fruitful for my study.

2.5 Text analysis

I have, in addition to interviews and observation, also used text-based analysis for mapping out the political and discursive context of the Climate and Forest Initiative. I have used project descriptions, official reports, speeches, public debates, declarations and relevant literature – to get an overview of the Norwegian positions on REDD and how the initiative has evolved more historically. The website of the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative, as well as the REDD-monitor-blog and the Mongabay website have been particularly important resources for a variety of information and knowledge.

3. REDD

3.1 REDD – a multifaceted acronym

REDD is an acronym for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation. The goal is that REDD can be part of a post-2012 climate regime and end up as a potential climate partnership between the global north and the global south. The relatively new acronym REDD has therefore become important in global discourses about climate, environment and development. This chapter begins with a short outline of how REDD, as a term and policy approach, has evolved internationally in recent years. The difficulties in doing so are that the principles of REDD are both disputed and continually in flux. Nevertheless, it is possible and necessary to provide some description of REDD and how it can be defined.

A very straightforward way to put it, is to say that REDD is the idea, or based on the idea, that maintains that by putting a value on living trees we can make them worth more alive than dead. A more technical definition of REDD is found in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Bali Action Plan (2007). The action plan describes REDD as;

> "Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries."

The latest addition to this is to use REDD+ as the accurate acronym. The plus sign indicates that the enhancement of carbon stocks is also taken into account

(Angelsen 2009:2). Since my thesis does not have predominant focus on these more technical distinctions in REDD-discussion, I will continue to use the less cumbersome REDD, without the plus sign. It is however, still important to be aware of this distinct detail.

As Arild Angelsen (2009) points out, REDD "has evolved as a concept and means different things to different countries, organisations and individuals". The latest book edited by Angelsen; "Realising REDD+ National strategy and policy option" (2009), uses REDD+ as "an umbrella term for local, national and global actions that reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation". It is also important to add that REDD is "a shorthand for both a set of *policies* or *actions* that aim to reduce emissions and increase removals, and for the final *outcomes* of those policies or actions" (Angelsen 2009:2). This considered, REDD is a truly multifaceted acronym, which can create some misunderstanding and difficulties in talking about it, but may at the same time open a space for interpretations for the different actors involved with REDD. If we want to obtain a deeper understanding of REDD and policies connected to the initiative, it is important to investigate how different actors see REDD as different things and how this diverse area of understanding is used by the same actors to create meanings which fit their visions of reality.

3.2 Actors involved

REDD involves and is supported by a conglomeration of actors on local, national, regional and global level. Nation states from both the global north and south, different NGOs, multilateral organisations, regional funds and private business actors interact in different REDD defined actions. In the global south we see the

big tropical forest countries such as Brazil, Indonesia and Congo, but we also find smaller countries which are relatively important REDD-actors such as, for instance, Papua New-Guinea, Guyana, Liberia, Vietnam and a dry forest country like Tanzania. The UN-REDD programme incorporates nine pilot countries: Tanzania, Zambia, DR Congo, Indonesia, Papua New-Guinea, Vietnam, Paraguay, Panama and Bolivia.

Talking about involved actors in the global north is more difficult, because we do not know yet how REDD will develop and who will, in the end, be the most important contributors. Until now, Norway has tried to set the standard by committing US$600 million a year to support REDD activities in different countries and through different channels. The commitment of others is not that certain, but in Copenhagen, COP 15 December 2009 resulted in six countries: France, UK, USA, Japan and Australia in addition to Norway, promising 3, 5 billion dollars to immediate REDD action during the period of 2010-2012. Germany was supposed to join this group but left it at a late stage in the COP 15 negotiations. They nevertheless have their own initiative that may be incorporated at a later stage [3]. Many of these countries and others are also involved through multilateral institutions. Of the multilateral institutions involved in REDD, we find the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which are all involved via the abovementioned UN-REDD programme. The World Bank is involved through the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and Forest Investment Programme (FIP). International NGOs involved in REDD are numerous and include NGOs working with an array of agendas including climate, environment, development, livelihood, indigenous

[3] Germany was in May 2010 part of an extended REDD financing initiative.

people and rights issues. As a curiosity worth mentioning, we note the Prince of Wales Rainforest Project, where the Prince, through his project, wishes to work toward a goal of "making the forests worth more alive than dead" (PRP 2007). We also have a growing number of national and regional funds also established in relation to REDD, such as the Amazon Fund and the Congo Basin Fund. Last but not least, we observed more business-oriented actors in the form of carbon traders and multinational corporations. One of the most influential firms in the world today is, for example, Goldman Sachs. It is difficult to say how influential they have been with regard to REDD, but Sjur Kasa, senior research fellow at CICERO, indicates that they have been a promoting part of the process. He adds that we also have to keep in mind that the city of London sees the global carbon market as hopefully growing to becoming the biggest of the future financial markets. Additionally, the substantial amount of financing that REDD requires has to be obtained from the private market. At the Carbon Trading Summit in 2010, which Goldman Sachs attended, the primary target was, for example, to create "the world's largest commodity market in carbon-backed securities"[4]. These interests are often linked with one or more of the aforementioned actors. The trend is, as I explore more in-depth later in the thesis, that actors who previously saw themselves as enemies, and also were interpreted as such, now collaborate in new and unusual alliances between forest companies, financial institutions, businesses and NGOs, communities, and states.

It is interesting then to see how all these different actors, despite their differing agendas and ideas about the world, have one thing in common: they find the idea of REDD attractive. The question is, therefore: why is REDD seen as such an attractive idea? When writing about multilateral institutions and development,

[4] http://latimesdaily.com/2010/05/15/khadija-sharife-redd-seeing-the-forest-for-the-trees/

Bøås and McNeill (2004:11) state that: "For an idea to be attractive to multilateral institutions it must (…) be possible to adapt or distort it in accordance with already existing problem definitions of development". This quote is not only applicable for multilateral institutions, but for all actors involved in the REDD initiative. The initiative is shaped in such a way that it fits with the different actors' discursive toolboxes. At the same time, we see that the initiative can be interpreted as many different things and has a relatively open area in which to manoeuvre, so that different actors with different agendas can find it attractive. It is within this generous manoeuvring space that Norway also navigates and where different Norwegian actors are finding themselves.

3.3 Paying for Environmental Services (PES)

The first steps towards a REDD initiative were taken at the COP 11 in Montreal in 2005, where Papua New-Guinea and Costa Rica put forward a proposal called "Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to simulative action". The two countries were part of the Coalition of Rainforest Countries (CfRN) and it is this initiative that later developed into REDD[5]. The person behind this process is worth mentioning. Joseph Conrad, who is a close friend of the Prime Minister in Papua New Guinea, Michael Somare, had suggested in 2003 that the Prime Minister ask for financial compensation from the world community for the anti-deforestation conditions that came from the World Bank. It was this suggestion that gave the birth to what we now know of as REDD. Conrad is now the executive director of CfRN, a coalition which promotes the trading of carbon stored in forests: "The Rainforest Coalition seeks to incorporate certified emissions offsets related to deforestation (in addition to aforestation and reforestation) within global carbon emissions markets by

[5] Interestingly, Costa Rica is not, at least so far, aspiring for REDD-funding.

revising the Marrakech Accords, amending the Kyoto Protocol, or developing a linked 'optional protocol' under the UNFCCC"[6].

Before 2005, we find different initiatives targeting both deforestation and forest degradation. One of these is Paying for Environmental Services (PES) which has, since the 1990s, been introduced as an economic instrument to fight deforestation and environmental degradation. The instrument is designed to give economic incentives to land users to protect their environment, in such a way that it can continue to provide certain ecosystem services such as water, carbon or biodiversity that will have a broader benefit for certain users or the society as a whole (FAO 2008). The instrument is then designed so that a buyer who values environmental services can pay the land users supplying the services "if, and only if, the seller actually delivers the environmental service" (Angelsen 2009:316). This performance-based system is continued as an important part of the REDD-structure, where payments are supposed to be made for emissions reductions from reduced deforestation and forest degradation.

In the beginning REDD was seen as only PES. The critics to such a REDD-design are concerned about how a PES-focus may turn REDD into a market-based programme with only market-based solutions. If REDD ends up in mainly PES-like projects, this will be seen as a massive privatisation of the forest sector - so maintained Pål Vedeld, professor at NORAGRIC in an interview. There are, nevertheless, strong indications that REDD is going in a more market-based direction.

[6] http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/eng/initiatives/carbon_emissions.php

Related to the PES discussion on REDD is the discussion on CDM (Clean Development Mechanism). CDM is an offset mechanism that is part of the article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. The mechanism is designed so that Annex I countries (the developed countries) can meet their emissions reduction targets through investments in clean development projects in Annex II countries (developing countries). Looking at CDM as part of a possible future of REDD is controversial, but important for many of the REDD actors.

3.4 IPCC and the Stern Report

After the COP 11 in Montreal, there have been two reports that are often mentioned as milestones in the history of REDD. The fourth IPCC report on climate change is one of them and was launched in 2007. The report first stated that emissions from the global north had to be reduced by 25 – 40% by 2020, while the increased emissions from the global south had to be stemmed by 2020 and the world as a whole had to reduce emissions by 50 – 85 % by 2050. In addition, IPCC stated that the peak in global emissions must occur in the period between 2000 and 2015 (IPCC 2007). This was not new information, but these goals were seen as further away from being realised than ever. It was important to look at new solutions and IPCC stated that approximately 17.4% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions stems from forestry (including deforestation). When writing about mitigation efforts, it then states that: "Financial incentives (national and international) to increase forest area, to reduce deforestation and to maintain and manage forests; land-use regulation and enforcement" has the potential to be environmentally effective in the climate change efforts (IPCC 2007).

Before the IPCC report, the Stern Report was released in October 2006.. The report, which was commisioned by the British Government, discusses the effects of climate change and global warming on the world economy. The conclusion was that if 1% of global GDP is invested in curbing the deforestation rate, the worst effect of climate change can be hindered. This will also save the world from a global GDP loss of 20% (The Stern Report 2006). It is seen as economically beneficial to try to do something about the deforestation rate. The report claims that what we now only know as REDD can be both relatively cheap and easy in comparison with other climate efforts, and this statement was tempting for many policy makers. Among those is the Norwegian Prime Minister and social economist, Jens Stoltenberg.

3.5 Three phased approach

The REDD-architecture is still in process, but several countries have put forward a proposal for a three-phased approach to how REDD can function in a post-2012 climate regime. This three-phased approach will be featured by policy designing, consultations, consensus building and testing and evaluation (Angelsen et al. 2009:3). At present, all national REDD-strategies are in phase 1. Such an approach includes:

- PHASE 1: An initial support instrument that allows countries to access immediate international funding for national REDD strategy development, including national dialogue, institutional strengthening, and demonstration activities.
- PHASE 2: A fund-based instrument that allows countries to access predictable REDD finance, based upon agreed criteria. Continued

funding under this instrument would be result-based, but performance would not necessarily be monitored or measured only on the basis of emissions and removals against reference levels.

- PHASE 3: A GHG-based instrument that rewards performance on the basis of quantified forest emissions and removals against agreed reference levels (Angelsen et al. 2009:3).

One of the reasons why forest was not seen as viable and not included in climate negotiations earlier was that there was no developed credible system for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of deforestation and forest degradation. Such a system is now closer to becoming fully viable and is developed simultaneously through all these phases. Data on both land use change and carbon stocks will be collected. This process implies many challenges, especially in countries where allocating enough resources for monitoring may be difficult. Remote sensing using new satellite technology is one of the proposed solutions to this problem. Funds then have to be made available for developing countries so that they may be part of national monitoring systems (Angelsen et al. 2009:21). The Norwegian position on this is that developed countries have to provide resources for capacity building on MRV in developing countries[7].

[7] See for example: http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/norway090209b.pdf

4. Theoretical framework

4.1 Modernization and dependency

Development is seen as one of the most central and dominating ideas of the 20th century. Different theoretical frameworks have been created to not only understand, but also improve and criticize the phenomenon and the practices attached to the developmental idea. Modernization theory and the oppositional dependency theory were the main theoretical directions in this regard. While the modernization school saw development as an evolutionary process in which poor countries were supposed to climb the ladder of development or reach different stages of industrialisation and economic growth, the dependency theorist was critical and more concerned about the way in which all countries are interconnected and not isolated entities. They saw development and underdevelopment as causally linked to each other. They argued that development in the centre of the world system was dependent on underdevelopment in the periphery. Development and underdevelopment were seen as two opposed concepts interconnected through relations of power. Dependency theorists focused on these power relations and how the centre exploited the periphery, but what they failed to question was the content of the development concept itself and the two categories that were produced, namely developed and underdeveloped economies/countries. Dependency theory has however, taught us an important lesson through bringing to light an understanding of causality in time and space in the analysis of the relation between poverty and wealth in the world. Nustad (2003:85) uses the term simultaneity to refer to this causality in time and place and notes:

> As long as time has been used to explain differences in development, it has been possible to ignore relations between underdeveloped and developed countries. However, when dependency theorists insisted on a contemporary understanding, these relations were emphasised as an explanation of poverty. Dependency theory's focus on external connections appears in this way, a result of an insistence upon simultaneity[8].

This insistence upon simultaneity is central to my thesis. I want to argue that simultaneity is still often ignored. This ignorance of simultaneity calls for a closer investigation of that which followed modernization and dependency – post-development theory.

4.2 Critical development theory

In the late 1980s, a group of poststructuralist authors began to analyse development as a powerful discourse. A discourse is a certain way to talk about and understand the World (or a part of the World). Discourse analysis is to "investigate how people strategically use the available discourses to portray themselves and the world in certain (advantageous) ways" (Jørgensen and Philips 1999:9, 16). "Thinking of development as a discourse makes it possible to maintain the focus of domination (…) and at the same time to explore more

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[8] My own english translation. Original quote: så lenge forskjell i tid ble brukt til å forklare forskjell i utvikling, var det mulig å se bort fra relasjoner mellom underutviklete og utviklete land. Når avhengihetsteoretikerne derimot insisterte på samtid, ble plutselig relasjonene løftet frem som årsaksforklaring på fattigdom. På denne måten fremstår avhengihetsteoriens fokus på de eksterne forbindelsene som et resultat av insisteringen på samtidighet.

fruitfully the conditions of possibility and the most pervasive effects of development" (Escobar 1995:5-6). Post-development theorists' main claim, expressed very bluntly, is that development as a project does not work. They question the whole development/underdevelopment-dichotomy and its content. Wolfgang Sachs (1995), one of the strongest advocates of what we today recognise as post-development theory states; "At a time when development has evidently failed as a socio-economic endeavour, it has become of paramount importance to liberate ourselves from its dominion over our minds" (Sachs 1995:5). The post-development writers see the need for deconstructing the development discourse that, according to them, has done more harm then good. They are also trying to understand how the dominant discourse neglects alternative development patterns and pathways to development (Nustad 2004:13). Escobar (1995) uses the term "colonization of reality" and explains how "certain representations [of reality] become dominant and shape indelibly the ways in which reality is imagined and acted upon". He sees how the dominant discourse "produces permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualifying and even making others impossible" (Escobar 1995:5).

One of the most important post-development writers, James Ferguson, investigates in his book, *The Anti-Politics Machine* (1994), the claim that development does not work, and asks why development programs continue even though they often fail. He argues that, to understand this, we have to look at the effects that the development discourse produces. One of these effects is the depoliticizing of poverty. In an attempt to understand the social processes that developers are intervening in, they must make certain abstractions of reality. Political aspects of reality often disappear out of the analysis through the simplification of complexity. We then get what James Ferguson (1994) names *The Anti-Politics Machine*. Both the understanding of poverty and the

development intervention is depoliticized. Through a case study in Lesotho, Ferguson argues that:

> 'Development' institutions generate their own form of discourse, and this discourse simultaneously constructs Lesotho as a particular kind of object of knowledge, and creates a structure of knowledge around that object. Interventions are then organised on the basis of these structures of knowledge which, while failing on their own terms, nonetheless have regular effects, which include the expansion and entrenchment of bureaucratic state power, side by side with the projection of a representation of economic and social life which denies 'politics' and, to the extent that it is successful, suspends its effects (Ferguson 1994:xiv-xv).

Development interventions thus often fail, because they ignore the highly political dimension they intervene within. When politics are not taken into account in an analysis on poverty reduction, developers are left with a limited description of reality. Poverty is seen as a non-political and geographically limited problem and phenomenon. In the case of Lesotho, the World Bank constructed and understood poverty in a limited national frame and described it as a product of unfortunate geographical circumstances and as a consequence of the absence of technical development. Historical and structural causes and regional and political circumstances were neglected in the analysis. Depoliticizing did, therefore, occur in the process of describing and analysing poverty and in determing what sort of cure was proposed (Ferguson 1994). This became clearer when Ferguson (2006) compared the way in which the development discourse represents Lesotho with the way the situation in the Bantu-state Transkei was interpreted. The South-African apartheid regime was trying to make the same anti-political manoeuvre with the Transkei as the World Bank did in the Lesotho case. The regime tried to separate different patterns of development in the nation

and saw the different "Bantu-states" as politically enclosed entities unattached to the rest of the South African state which, with technical assistance from the apartheid regime, could achieve separate development.[9]

> 'In at least some respect then, the "illegitimate" and internationally despised "development' activities in Transkei and the "legitimate", internationally beloved "development" initiatives in Lesotho – so different in the view from afar – looked a good deal alike when seen closer up" (Ferguson 2006:61).

However, for the apartheid developers, the problem was that their national developmental construction was more visible as a construct both inside and outside the South African state. Politicized critique was launched from the start and it insisted on uncovering the simultaneity: on seeing poverty in the constructed Bantu-states as connected with the wealth in the urban white areas.. By insisting on this connection, the situation was also politicized (Ferguson 2006:60-64). South-Africans and the ANC insisted on such a connection and argued that the South-African society had to be seen as one. They therefore deconstructed the divided society and claimed new solutions and worked toward the abolishing of the repressive apartheid regime (Nustad 2004:25). In the case of Lesotho, which Ferguson argues has to be seen as part of a regional dynamic, fully encapsulated geographically by South Africa, simultaneity was never brought into the analysis. The dominant discourse succeeded in placing their poverty issues inside the borders of the nation and obscuring regional connections (Ferguson 2006:65).

[9] 'The South African planners always claimed that "apartheid" only meant "separate development" and that they where eager to help "the Bantu" to "develop" within their own independent "Bantu-states' (Ferguson 2006:60).

Drawing from Knut Nustads' work on Norway and development, the term ‘temporal segregation’ offers us a useful tool to use in our analysis. By temporal segregation Nustad means;

> ‘How an image of poor countries belonging in a separate sphere, separated from our selves is created. It is thereby harder to create representations of the relation between Norwegian wealth and others’ poverty where causal links have been made between the two (Nustad 2003:46)[10].

The phenomenon ‘temporal segregation’ refers to how the language of the development discourse disconnects poverty in the majority world from wealth in donor countries in the global north. As seen in Ferguson’s Lesotho/Transkei comparison, wealth and poverty are seen as two separate entities in two separate spheres, separated both in time and space. The discursive language of development has the tendency to remove the causal links between the two. Development programmes with a focus on the transfer of money as the main strategy, are therefore removing and ignoring simultaneity in the analysis, the same process of ignoring/removing simultaneity that was criticised by the dependency theories. This process is characterised by a de-politicization of reality and development interventions and thus creates effects of power where all connections and relations between poverty and wealth are removed.

4.3 Ecocracy

How can we then understand this development critique in connection with environment and conservation? Many post-development writers will argue that

[10] Translated quote: Hvordan det tegnes et bilde av fattige land som tilhørende en separat sfære, atskilt fra oss selv. Derved blir det vanskeligere å gi fremstillinger av forholdet mellom norsk velstand og andres fattigdom hvor det ble etablert årsakssammenhenger mellom de to.

we have to expand the critique of development to the environment and the need for control, governance and management over it (Sachs 1992, Escobar 1995).

The development agenda had, since the beginning of the post-war period, been fixated on economic growth as a paradigm of change. Growth is thus seen as the best tool with which to abolish poverty. We saw in the 1970's a growing concern about how this growth mentality both had a negative impact on poverty and also had a devastating impact on the environment. Many argued that the growth paradigm had to be broken, so that poverty issues could be solved and the environment spared from oil spills, deforestation, acid rain and desertification. The main idea and argument behind these anti-growth theories was that the nature was finite, and not an endless reserve of resources (Daly 1996).

The international development elite did not find these perspectives viable, and nor did a lot of development country leaders, neither from the bio-centric viewpoint, nor from the humanist angle. It was not possible to convince the drivers of development that the exploitation of nature had to change. Concerns for the environment and cravings for development were therefore seen as completely opposite dimensions. It was not until the Brundtland Report (1987) and the introduction of the term "sustainable development", that we saw an attempted reconciliation between these two dimensions. This meant, in practice, that the imperative of growth could still dominate and, as a result, ideas about non-growth were left out of high-level talks and practices. Wolfgang Sachs (1992) argues that the main concern behind this merging process was not grounded in an overall concern about nature or the negative impacts the growth paradigm had on poverty-issues. It was rather the growing concern for economic prospects of the future that led to this fusion. Governments all over the world

started to realize that the continuance of growth depended on available natural resources. The Brundtland Report concludes: “We have in the past been concerned about the impacts of economic growth upon the environment. We are now forced to concern ourselves with the impact of ecological stress upon our economic prospects” (Brundtland Report 1987).

However, concerning REDD, there is another quote from this report which set the standard and exemplifies the continuance of what we would later know of as managerial discourse: “This new reality, from which there is no escape, must be recognized – and managed” (Brundtland Report 1987:1). Wolfgang Sachs (1992) argues that we are facing what he calls a new ecocracy. Ecocracy is a world order where so-called “eco-crats” find capital-, bureaucracy-, and science-intensive solutions to environmental decline. Bureaucracy in this case is not only referring to state bureaucracy but also to bureaucratic development interventions. In this world order, the industrial model of living and how it influences the environment is never questioned. Sachs argues that we ought to do exactly that; but instead every new environment challenge is met by professional bureaucratic tools and technology. He sees a discourse rising in prominence, which has a fundamentally biased orientation:

> ‘it calls for extended management, but disregards intelligent self-limitation. As the danger mounts, new products, procedures and programmes [or initiatives?] are invented to stave off the threatening effects of industrialism and keep the system afloat” (Sachs 1992:35).

He continues describing how the eco-cratic discourse is “unwilling to reconsider the logic of competitive productivism which is at the root of the planet’s ecological plight”. As with the development interventions described earlier, targeting poverty in Lesotho, this discourse is reducing “ecology to a set of

managerial strategies aiming at resource efficiency and risk management. It treats as a technical problem what in fact amounts to no less than a civilization impasse – namely, that the level of productive performance already achieved turns out not viable in the North, let alone for the rest of the globe" (Sachs 1992:36).

Sachs' ideas can certainly be accused of being a post-development critique taken to the extreme, or of being so obsessed with the ecological failure of an "industrial civilization" that he has become too blind to spot a possible middle course. It is, nevertheless, interesting to use his method of reasoning as a bridge between critical development theory and conservation/management. With this in mind, is it interesting to see how REDD fits into such a picture. Is it, for example, possible to argue that REDD is only a contemporary extension of this eco-cratic discourse, a fair attempt at finding a middle road, or a radically new way to face the global environment challenges? The different actors involved with REDD will possibly have different opinions on this, but let us first investigate an attempt to distinguish two opposed discourses on environment and development.

4.4 Narratives and discourses on deforestation

As Emery Roe (1991) explains, a development narrative often follows the common definition of a "story"; with a beginning, middle and an end. The typical development narrative describes scenarios "about what will happen if the events or positions are carried out as described" (Roe 1991:288). In the form of an argument, they set the premises and conclusions in different developmental and environmental scenarios (Leach and Mearns 1996:7). Development narratives are thus, as Ferguson also argues, programmatic; they describe a problem in a certain way and prescribe thereafter its solution. The receivers are

then supposed to respond and act in a certain manner. According to Leach and Mearns (1996:8), these narratives are made on ‘stabilizing’ assumptions to facilitate decision-making that ‘serve to standardize, package and label environmental problems so that they appear to be universally applicable and to justify equally standardized, off-the-shelf solutions’. Roe (1991) emphasizes how, for example, rural development is an uncertain and complex activity. This is something earlier initiatives on deforestation have proven. Practitioners, bureaucrats and policy makers then use these narratives as a simplification of this uncertainty. By creating “broad explanatory narratives that can be operationalised into standard approaches with widespread applications”, uncertainties at the micro level are then solved (Roe 1991:288). Despite the recognising of extremely complex difficulties among REDD-practitioners, these difficulties are also being operationalised into standard development approaches.

An example can be found in the influential and persistent desertification narrative. Swift (1996) explains how, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, an international consensus about desertification was created. The challenge was in general portrayed and explained in neo-Malthusian terms with population growth and inappropriate land-use as the main causes of the problem. Local herders with their goats were often seen as the main villains in this narrative. One scenario that was being claimed was how the southern Saharan edge would advance annually as much as 6 km. While the desertification narrative was made out of poorly researched ideas and was, after some years, claimed inaccurate and exaggerated, this almost apocalyptical scenario led to broad international action. This action called for more environmental management and created legitimacy for new control regimes over dry land resources. It is an interesting parallel here to the way the Brundtland Report focused on the same need for management over nature. Swift (1996:90) argues that ‘the narrative established the right of the

winners – national governments, aid bureaucracies and some scientists – to participate [in decision making] and to try to impose their view'. The losers in this narrative were the rural dry land herders who lost control over important resources to central planning and land tenure reform. One of the interesting elements of this narrative is how it is being used as a programmatic tool to defend a certain type of intervention. The different dry land contexts are portrayed in a certain way using a particular narrative which fits with the planners', both national and international, desire for control and management. Not very different from what we saw in Fergusons (1994) Lesotho case. '[Swift] finds the explanation for its persistence in the fact that it serves well the interests of donor agencies and national governments in perpetuating various forms of planned development' (Leach and Mearns 1996:13). The question is then, whether or not REDD will be a new control regime over wet tropical forest areas, the same way that anti-desertification initiatives were over the dry land areas. The next question is who the winner and who the loser will be this time, in a REDD-initiative in which involved actors communicate that all are winners. This is further elaborated on in chapter 4.8.

4.5 Managerial and populist discourse

Different narratives about environment and development are usually part of broader discourses. Adger et al. (2001:683) define discourse broadly as a shared meaning of a phenomenon. They see discourses as different knowledge regimes. In these shared meanings lie certain suitable narratives that confirm a discourse. The discourse is produced, transformed and reproduced by actors in written text and oral statements. By comparing four different environmental issues, Adger et al. (2001) identify two clusters of main discourses: the *Managerial* discourse and the *Populist* discourse. It is important to know that this dichotomy is a somewhat

stylised version of reality, but is nevertheless a useful tool to describe and understand institutional practices related to development and environment.

It is widely held that the managerial discourse is the dominating one in international politics and is characterized by a top-down, interventionist and technocentrist approach (Adger et al. 2001:701). This discourse is what Sachs (1995) calls the eco-cratic discourse. Some will also argue that, although the role of the state is important, a managerial discourse is in favour of embracing market-oriented solutions. Lorraine Elliot (1999:1) says: "International political responses to the globalised challenges of environmental change have been accommodated within and informed by neo-liberal values and modalities". The REDD-initiative must, it is argued, be seen in relation to this neo-liberal feature of the managerial discourse.

But also, what Adger et al. (2001:701) see as diametrically opposed to the managerial discourse, the populist discourse is important for a deeper understanding of the REDD-initiative. The populist discourse identifies the same crises but uses different narratives to explain them. The heroes, villains and victims in the narratives are more or less different and traditionally opposed to what we find in the managerial discourse (Adger et al. 2001:685). Where, in the managerial discourse, the local population is often seen as the primary villain destroying their natural surroundings with traditional slash-and-burn practices, these same actors are turned into victims and heroes in the populist discourse. This has not always been the case. In pre-1980's environmentalist philosophy, the focus was concentrated solely on flora and fauna, and 'the presence of people tended to be seen as an obstacle to environmental preservation' (Conklin and Graham 1995:697). The shift in the 1980s towards sustainable development

changed this philosophy; now local forest dwellers are, at least by some NGOs such as RFN, seen as the key actors in reaching the goal of sustainable forest practices and conservation. Indigenous people are, by the populist discourse, seen as the number one forest caretakers in these discourses and must therefore be targeted and given rights to claim their land. According to Conklin and Graham, (1995:696) this philosophy can be traced back to the old idea of "the noble savage", which was prominent in the writings of old European philosophers such as Rousseau and Montaigne. Native cultures were idealised as living in harmony with nature and were seen as a contrast to the modern ideas of the European destructive materialism. They argue that Western environmentalists today have created a similar ideal, where ecology is distinctly emphasised. 'Native peoples in general, and Native Americans in particular, came to be widely viewed as "natural conservationists" who use environmental resources in ways that are non-destructive, sustainable and mindful of effects of future generations' We can find such organisations as RFN as strong advocators of such ideas. Their focus on indigenous rights in their anti-deforestation work has to be seen as part of the populist discourse. Indigenous people were also formerly seen as irrelevant, and left out of the dominating development discourse, but this aforementioned shift, towards sustainable development and sustainable management practices, led to an incorporation of the indigenous population in the development discourse as well as in the environmentalist/populist discourse. Yet, as many anthropologists, historians and some native leaders have noted, there are no guarantees that the 'Native Americans' relations to nature are equivalent to Western environmentalist principles' (Conklin and Graham 1995:697-698).

The main conclusion drawn by Adger et al. (2001:709) was that both discourses simplify reality and that there are striking discrepancies between the discursive simplifications and the diversity of situations in local context. They link this

production of simplifications to what Scott (1998) sees as a ‘project of legibility’. That is, how states have always worked out, through more and more advanced methods of simplification and standardization, ways to make their population, nature and space legible. Through in-depth descriptions of urban planning in post-mediaeval Europe, the state creation of surnames in the Philippines under the Spanish and the imposition of a standard language in France, he explains how state modernisation projects also implicate the need for increased control and the creation of a legible people (Scott 1998).

State projects are still in need of such a control through simplifications, but so too are development interventions, conservation organisations and rainforest initiatives. It is therefore interesting to see how these dynamics unfold in the REDD-initiative. Adger et al. (2001:709) points to the shortcomings of managerial and populist discourses when it comes to understanding problems and solutions to environmental challenges. Like the dominant development discourse, they create narratives that fit their discourse and their solution to the problem. They also, to some extent, leave out alternative causal explanations to problems, whether it is deforestation, desertification or other environmental challenges (Ferguson 1994). They then create what Büscher and Dressler (2007), while describing the consensus in the development/conservation discourse, see as ‘a layer of discursive blur’ which obscures the gap between reality and rhetoric.

Both the managerial discourse and the populist discourse are visible in the REDD-initiative, and perhaps especially if we focus on Norway, where RFN has been a central actor. The Norwegian altruistic aid philosophy can also, however, be seen as part of both discourses. It is therefore interesting to take a closer look

into the case of Norway and see how the Norwegian REDD-narrative is constructed and how the two different discourses are visible.

4.6 Commodification of nature (Neoliberal conservation)

The dominating idea of recognising the market value of different aspects of nature and ecological services is part of what we know as commoditisation of nature. In REDD, government, companies or communities will be rewarded financially for not cutting down their forests. A value has to be put on standing trees to create an economic incentive for not cutting them down. This is the key message from REDD-actors such as, for example, Jens Soltenberg. Also, the possible opening for an inclusion of REDD in a future carbon market makes this especially important to explore. Escobar (1995) explains how processes of commodifying nature have been connected especially to a rising discourse of biodiversity. Viewing the forest as a potential carbon sink is now included in this process. Escobar explains how "species of flora and fauna are valuable not as much as resources but as reservoirs of value that research and knowledge, along with biotechnology, can release for capital and communities" (Escobar 1995:203). He sees this as the reason why tropical forest dwellers have finally been recognised as rightful owners of their territory, "but only to the extent that they accept to treat it – and themselves – as reservoirs of capital" (Escobar 1995:203). The local forest people are then seen as stewards of the social and natural capital working on behalf of the world economy. There are two arguments that are crucial in this. Firstly, to acknowledge how nature, through different biodiversity and climate initiatives, is being more and more commodified. And secondly, how this process of commodification is encapsulating and concealing causal links inside the apparently neutral idea of commodities. These commodities are in turn traded on the international market and other aspects of this and other tropical forest transactions become blurred.

Deforestation, connected causally to a global capitalist production of commodities, is thus obscured in this process of commodification. Anna Tsing (2005:51) argues that we have to look closer at the international chain of commodities that, manifested as the end product, have no traces of the friction created from the journey from raw material to the object of consumers' desire. This friction can be manifest in different ways: awkward, unequal, unstable and creative processes appearing at different global encounters. It can be both good and bad, but the main idea behind her work is that these chains of production are not a smooth operating machine, but a process of friction.

Processes of commodification are closely linked to processes of neoliberalisation. Neoliberalism is seen by many as a dominating concept in the world today (Harvey 2005). Neoliberalisation can be explained as a bundle of global processes, varying from location to location, but always revolving around a core idea that market solutions are better than state-based solutions. Privatisation, marketisation, market-based solutions in the public sector (New Public Management) and state-led transitions of services from state to civil society are examples of such neoliberalisation processes (Castree 2007:142). Deregulation and privatisation are often seen as the ultimate goal of neoliberal policies (Igoe and Brockington 2007). Neoliberalism can also be explained as " the financialization of everything and the reallocation of the power centre of capital accumulation to owners and their financial institutions at the expense of other factions of capital" (Harvey 2006:24) But Neoliberalism has not made the state and its institutions irrelevant, and the dichotomy state-market can therefore be argued as being a simplification. It is more a matter of the emergence of a neo-liberal state which has a fundamental mission in creating a good business climate. The neo-liberal state therefore functions as a facilitator of business interest and is always looking for new fields of capital accumulation (Harvey 2006:25).

In REDD, trees and carbon are – through a neoliberal discourse - treated as purely technical objects that can be measured, validated and may also be traded in future carbon markets. The rainforest becomes something technical and quantifiable, with no history, no political implications and no power relations attached to it. The encapsulations of these dimensions inside entities such as trees and carbon are recognisably the same as the process of power effects that are described in the post-development literature. It is therefore interesting to see what sort of causal links are not taken into the discussions about REDD. REDD is also dependent on a detailed control system which is based on using advanced technology and satellites in orbit in space. Satellites will monitor countries' and local communities' forest activities. This monitoring is the security mechanism that shall secure the performance-based system where money is only transferred after deforestation measures are proven successful. Some would label these methods as typical examples of neoliberal management techniques, which in REDD, have new and, some would argue, extreme dimensions in terms of satellites.

Development thinking and planning has also been accused of being dominated by neoliberal ideas. The emergence of the so-called Washington Consensus, which according to some is dominating in multilateral institutions such as IMF and the World Bank, has created a strong belief in market-based solutions as the best way to achieve development. This, in turn, means that the state should withdraw from development programmes and let the market take over such processes. This method of reasoning was part of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP), which have, since the 1980s, been implemented in the global south by IMF and the World Bank to reduce poverty. Loans from these institutions are granted on

conditions that favour the market and diminish the role of the state[11]. These programmes were supposed to stabilize fragile economies and spur economic growth through the devaluation of currencies, the deregulation of markets, reduced bureaucracies and the privatization of state industries and services. In Africa the result was, instead of prosperity and growth, the lowest rate of growth recorded and increased marginalisation and inequality between people (Ferguson 2006:11).

Considering global neoliberalism and the varying processes of neoliberalisation, would it perhaps be natural to look at neoliberal conservation as an oxymoron? At first glance, neoliberal ideas and conservation efforts would appear to be in opposition to each other. This has also been the common way to understand conservation, as a bulwark against neoliberal free-market capitalism, protecting the environment and its natural ecosystems (Igoe and Brockington 2007). However, some researchers have tried to challenge this dichotomy. They see a connection between neoliberal ideas and biodiversity conservation efforts and argue that 'neoliberalisation involves the reregulation of nature through forms of commoditization. This, in turn, entails new types of territorialisation: the partitioning of resources and landscapes in ways that control, and often exclude, local people'(Igoe and Brockington 2007:432). These forms of territorialisation are a reregulation of nature, 'which frequently creates new types of values and make those values available to national and transnational elites' (Igoe and Brockington 2007:432). Conservation must therefore not be seen as being opposed to neoliberalism, but more as a neoliberal need for control over nature that needs to be explained. According to Büscher (2010) it is conservation and

[11] SAP has been heavily criticised and has been replaced by Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Some would still argue that this is just a new name for the same policies that were dominating in SAP.

development interventions regulated through a wider, neoliberal political economy, which fuels and obscures (global) inequality. McAfee (1999:5) argues that

> ‘at the heart of the global environmental-economic paradigm is the neoclassical ideal of the world as a vast marketplace, in which all human-nature interactions, (…) can be understood as market-type exchanges’. The optimal goal is then to recognise nature in monetary-terms, ‘from molecules to mountainscapes, from human tissue to the earth atmosphere’ (McAfee 1999:2).

This also includes the realms of the world’s tropical rainforests. This post-structural way of understanding conservation has to be seen in parallel with the previous described neoliberal ideas of the managerial discourse and the critical development approach. It is also important to be aware of this connection when REDD is now becoming a number one framework for global conservation efforts.

4.7 The rhetoric of win-win-win

Biodiversity and growth are part of the conservation language. The fight against climate change has now added carbon storage to this win-win scenario. The Norwegian REDD-initiative aim is that ‘reducing deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) can produce a triple dividend – gains for the climate, for biodiversity and for sustainable development’.

Liza Grandia (2009:487) writes about the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (MBC) – a World Bank multi-million dollar project promoting both”conservation and sustainable development in a region with high rates of biological endemism as well as seemingly endemic poverty” (Grandia 2009:479). She describes how

the central MBC-planners[12] see markets as not only being able to solve 'development problems, but simultaneously to achieve environmental goals and inspire democratization'. A quote from the Minister of Environment in Honduras set the standard, "[MBC] has the objective of improving business opportunities and living standards, as well as conserving biodiversity and the quality of environmental services" (Honduras This Week, online 7/17/2000 in Grandia 2009:487). Grandia points out that we now have not only classical win-win scenarios but 'can now have "win-win-win-win-win-win-win" equations that benefit alike corporate investors, national economies, biodiversity, local people, western consumers, not to mention the World Bank and the big international NGOs (BINGOs)." We can now, in these REDD-dominating times add carbon storage to this equation and observe how REDD is also planned to benefit all involved actors.

The MBC-project has some interesting features that can also indicate some of the potential pitfalls of the REDD-initiative. Firstly, you have a huge conservation initiative with a lot of political willingness between a multitude of actors and the potential allocation of lots of well-distributed resources. Secondly, the rhetorical language of the project is strikingly similar to the one used in REDD-strategies; sustainable development and participation joined with a 'Bolivarian' concern for the poor. Thirdly, you find a colluding alliance between the Bank and conservation BINGO's[13] which absorbs most of the non-governmental resources. This prevents 'a broader vision of environmental justice that a mosaic approach to corridor conservation could otherwise have inspired' (Grandia 2007:497).

[12] Grandia (2007:497) realized that the World Bank is a 'many-headed hydra' and recognises that there are those within the Bank who try to reform it. She nevertheless finds it true that the main MBC-architects are not diverging from the bureaucratic 'business as usual' approach.

[13] BINGO (Big International Non-Governmental Organisations).

According to Grandia (2007), the neoliberal economic development goals were dominating in the MBC-performances, and long-term goals of biodiversity conservation were reduced. The outcome was then a 'biological corridor clearly aligned with other regional plans for neoliberal economic development and trade' (Grandia 2007:497).

It is important to point to these similarities between the REDD-initiative and the MBC-corridor. They are part of a trend, which can be described more as neoliberal environmentalism, reregulation, marketisation and commoditisation of nature, than what the REDD/MBC-rhetoric describes as participation, win-win-win scenarios, bottom-up approaches and pro-poor sustainable and indigenous development. There is a gap here between rhetoric and reality and the reason may be that REDD both can be seen as managerial top-down and populist bottom-up. As Nils Hermann Ranum from RFN explains, he thinks that REDD will adhere to both bottom-up and top-down principles. He somehow contradictorily says that it is clear that a REDD-framework never will be bottom-up, but that this will not work "if you do not incorporate the perspectives of the people living in the remotest areas of the forest". In both the MBC project and in the REDD-initiative lies the same idea about how the two initiatives are supposed to benefit all involved actors alike. This, in turn, is related to the so-called 'mobilizing metaphors', such as participation, ownership, capacity building and good governance (Büscher 2010:29). Mosse (2004:663) argues that the vagueness, ambiguity and lack of conceptual precision in these metaphors "is *required* to conceal ideological differences [and] to allow enrolment of different interests". These mobilizing metaphors are often used in the Norwegian discussions on REDD, and in my interviews with my informants. It is therefore interesting to see how Norway, with the REDD-initiative, enters into a post-development hornet's

nest where conservation is seen as one of the ultimate negative manifestations of the development machine.

4.8 Summary

I have, in this theory chapter, wanted to reflect critically upon how both development and environment initiatives are constructed around the idea that both poverty issues and environmental issues can be solved through instrumental and technical interventions. The dominant development discourse thus favours a managerial approach to nature, where the environment is controlled and governed. As such, REDD can be seen as an extension of this need for control on a global scale. In this understanding, REDD is then a global version of this technical solution. What complicates this is that REDD is interpreted, and can end up, as many different things. This is why the dichotomy put forward by Adger et al. (2001) is too simple for understanding this new environmental/developmental phenomenon. The REDD-initiative contains traces of both the managerial and populist discourses, at least rhetorically. My argument is still that despite these traces of both discourses, there are some strong indications that REDD has to be interpreted primarily as a grand top-down initiative where a dominant climate elite are creating programmes neither to change the system that produces poverty and environment degradation, nor to change the consumption patterns and climatic footprints of the Global North. The programmes are instead created to target the population less integrated into the global economy and change their behavioural patterns, whether these are subsistence farmers or rural forest dwellers in, say, Sulawesi. It is not certain that this is the best solution for the environment or for substantially reduced poverty rates. My argument which follows is that a huge initiative such as REDD and the rhetoric used in relation to this can instead obscure important causal links between both poverty and environmental issues. Through such initiatives, they

are, as a result, in danger of both targeting the wrong people and obscuring other and more fundamental causal links behind deforestation and climate change. It is important to emphasise here that this is only one possible dimension of a future REDD-regime. I still believe that it is important to realize that there is an under-communicated dimension of REDD that is reminiscent of more old-fashioned aid and is even more top-down and money driven than usual. No matter what a REDD system will look like in the end, it will be in need of strong monitoring and data control. If REDD, as many people intend, later becomes connected to a future carbon market, this will give it an even stronger neoliberal twist, a more explicit commodification of nature creating a stronger need for a detailed control system.

Through an analysis of successful anti-deforestation activism in Kalimantan in the 1980´s, Tsing (2005) discovered that the cooperation between different actors - in this case forest dwellers, provincial nature lovers and national environmental activists - was based on systematic misunderstandings. The interesting element of this is how these misunderstandings "– far from producing conflict – had allowed them to work together!" (Tsing 2005). Tsing observed that the social mobilization against deforestation is "based on negotiating more or less recognized differences in the goals, objects and strategies of the cause" (2005). Is it possible to find parallels of these dynamics in the international or Norwegian politics of climate change? Can we find similar systematic and constructive misunderstandings or discrepancies in goals, objects and strategies? Or are the different actors all neglecting one or more 'elephants in the room'? REDD's paradox lies in its flexibility and rigidity. At one level every actor, despite huge differences, understands REDD as something that fits their agendas and aims. On the other hand, REDD is also a fixed initiative dominated by the idea that

increased value on preserved forest is the number one solution to deforestation and degradation problems.

5. Critical approaches to Norwegian climate and development policy

”If everyone else had done the same as Norway, the world would have taken a significant step forward” [14]

Erik Solheim, December 2009[15].

In an interview prior to the COP 15 in Copenhagen, the Norwegian Minister of Environment and International Development, Erik Solheim, is very confident. When confronted with the oil paradox - that he represents one of the biggest oil producing countries in the world and still can feel confident to claim Norway a climate champion, Solheim replies that he sees the paradox but that, compared to the rest of the world, no other country is better than Norway in terms of environmental issues. ‘If everyone else had done the same as Norway, the world would have taken a significant step forward’. He adds that he, as the Norwegian Minister of Environment and International Development, is more or less internationally celebrated, but this ends when he arrives at Svinesund: “Then I only get yelled at”, he says and smiles. Erik Solheim was rewarded the UN Champion of the Earth prize in 2009 for his political leadership[16]. This may stand as a symbol of how he is internationally celebrated.

[14] Original quote: ”Hvis alle andre hadde gjort som Norge ville verden ha beveget seg et vesentlig skritt videre”

[15] In: Bergens Tidende, 3 December 2009.

[16] A prize that in 2010 was awarded to Bharrat Jagdeo,.the president of another important REDD-country, Guyana.

5.1 “Norway” presented

> ‘Through Norwegian statements on foreign policy and practices, a self-image is created and continued. This is done primarily for the Norwegian population, but is also aimed at the countries Norway interacts with and who observe Norwegian action’[17] (Leira et al. 2007:9) .

In the above statement by Solheim lies a deeply rooted understanding of Norway. Norway is often portrayed in contradiction with its geographical, economical, political and historical context. A report on power and democracy, that was carried out in an assignment by the Norwegian Parliament in the 1998-2003 period, emphasizes how “«Norway» since the early 1990’s has been built up as an international brand, as a special peace-loving and donor-friendly country with special tasks in the world community” (NOU 2003). This labeling and identity production of «Norway» is achieved by the so-called “engagement policy” which has dominated the post-cold war epoch in Norway. Norway was in this period declared World Champion of development aid, as the best emergency aid nation and as a humanitarian superpower by Norwegian political leaders. All this happened without a lot of discussion and with enthusiastic support from the civil society, academia and press (Tvedt 2009). The question is then whether the Norwegian REDD-initiative is a continuance of this tradition.

This policy implies international interventions such as aid, peace keeping and negotiations and promotion of democracy and human rights. This labeling process has been perpetuated by various Norwegian governments. It manifests itself in our role as negotiators in the Middle East, Sri Lanka, Darfur, and the donation of the world’s highest amount of per capita rates of aid to developing

[17] My own English translation.

countries. The idea of the Norwegian engagement policy - or Norway as an important actor in the global landscape promoting peace and social justice - is based on the impression of the country being placed in a unique historical situation. Chapter 12 in *the Report on Power and Democracy* continues with a description on the comparative advantages of Norway:

> "Norway's advantage in international politics was utilized – it is a small country without a colonial past in a peaceful corner of the world. It would be more difficult for a country with a more significant ability and tradition of power politics to have idealism as a trademark. This was the foundation for the image of Norway as a «humanitarian superpower» (NOU 2003:19, 12.1)[18].

The fact that Norway is a small country with no colonial heritage or past has been communicated as one of Norway's advantages in international engagement policy. Some consider the 400 years under the Danish crown as a colonial relationship and we can therefore claim our own historical uniqueness – Norway colonized by our Danish neighbors. This creates a myth about Norway as a European exception, the land of difference, removed from our factual political, economic and historical context. Once again, the Norwegian identity and political rhetoric are constructed around a limited understanding of Norway in the world. This is reminiscent of Ferguson's argument, discussed above, that Lesotho was constructed as a country divorced from its historical, economical and regional context. But in the case of Norway it is not the World Bank but Norway itself that is responsible for the ascribed identity. This self-ascribed identity can be understood as Norway's postcolonial identity (NOU 2003:19, 12).

[18] My own English translation.

This postcolonial identity is visible through what Nina Witoszek (2010) describes as a chorus of lyrical self-promotion. Quotes such as: Norway "is small … way up here and we have no colonial past" (Vidar Helgesen), "we are not Americans and we are not Europeans, we are just ourselves" (Morten Utgaard) and "our reputation is impeccable" (Janne Matlary)[19] confirm this myth. Many such quotations are found about the uniqueness and the comparative advantages of Norway, both in academic literature, political programs and the media. The population in Norway considers the country as a humanitarian nation and takes its unique historical background as a fact. The historical background is then used as proof of how Norway operates in, for example, the field of development, solely on good altruistic intentions – the good Norwegian Samaritan[20] working for a global good.

5.2 A different Norway presented

The image of Norway described above presents Norway as a remarkable actor in the international landscape of politics and development: Norway is in a unique mid-position. Not a former colonizer but rather colonized. Norway is a small country but still in the position to make a difference in the world. Some will, however, point out that this is a somewhat confusing image of Norway. Some would also say that it is completely wrong and misleading and that a disconnection of Norway from their real historical roots and geography would be a mistake.

[19] All quotations found in: Witoszek, Nina (2010): "Development as Dystopia". Development Today, 4-5 2010.

[20] The Norwegian Samaritan is used in Terje Tvedts' work on the Norwegian development system. See for example: Tvedt (2009:20-22)

It is, for instance, important to see that Norway as a European country has a colonial history. As a member of the NATO it has a history of anti-communism. As a capitalist country it has a history of accumulation (Neumann 2003:7). I would also add that there also exists a tremendous history of consumerism and an expanding ecological footprint. The fact that Norway is part of the rich fifth of the world's population that represents 80% of world consumption therefore has to be recognized. Norway also has a history of oppression towards minorities such as the Sámi and the Finns (Gullestad 2005:41).

Norway is one of the few non-colonial countries that increased its land area considerably under the last colonial period. Svalbard and the Bouvet-sector in the South Atlantic Ocean became Norwegian administrative areas in 1923 and 1939. The fact that these areas were not inhabited could be why this is not considered as colonialism . A Norwegian proposal at the peace negotiations at Versailles, 1919, could have changed this image. The minister Wedel Jarlsberg wanted Germany to give one of their African colonies to Norway as a compensation for lost tonnage during World War I (Kjærland and Rio 2009:6). Kjærland and Rio (2009) think that there are reasons for believing that Jarlsberg was probably interested in the German colony Tanganyika. Another fact often ignored is that the Norwegian government managed to increase its territory on the continental shelf considerably in the 1970's (Gullestad 2005:43). Thus, it ended up controlling a vast area of the coast, full of oil, gas and fish resources. All these examples point to an alternative view of Norwegian history where Norway is deeply rooted in the political realms of the global North. These realms are, among other things, characterized by historical domination of other parts of the world, expansive corporations, mass consumption and a high ecological footprint. On top of all this, Norway is an important oil and gas producer and net-exporter. This makes it especially hard for Norway to be a trustworthy actor in international climate

politics. They nevertheless manage to be one. By focusing on REDD, this schizophrenic process may be revealed.

5.3 The Norwegian regime of goodness

As mentioned above, Terje Tvedt is one of the most influential academic critics of the Norwegian development policy and cooperation. He won the Freedom of Expression Prize in 2007 for his examination of the Norwegian development cooperation, peace policies and the close connection between NGOs, research institutions, the political community and the Norwegian State[21]. One of Tvedts' main arguments is that we have to look behind what he sees as a discursive domination where dogmas and morality dominate. This discursive domination is not directly visible but veiled behind the notion and idea about "the good (noble) project". This project is an abstraction and a myth, says Tvedt. This myth projects Norway as a development aid power and peace broker and places this political field outside other political and social contexts (Tvedt 2009:11). In general, he argues, this political field is characterized by a wall of conventionalism, moral-ideological unassailability, national ritual self-affirmation and a system hidden behind conceptual, representational and moral power. Tvedt therefore sees the need to undress the Norwegian Samaritan as a power figure and understand the claimed hero of the nation in the age of globalization: the noble man in his fight on behalf of the World's poor (Tvedt 2009:12).

It is striking to see the enormous ambitions about development and poverty reduction in Norway. Tvedt (2009) uses an interview[22] with former Prime

[21] http://www.fritt-ord.no/en/priser/category/fritt_ords_pris/

[22] Dagbladet 4th of February 2008,

Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, to illustrate this. It said in the article that he had recently saved the lives of 80 million people on the African Horn. He had done this as a UN-envoy in the area. Tvedt says that if the story had been true this would have been a fantastic feat, 80 million people are more then any famine we have seen before in Africa. It would have made our former Prime Minister immortal. But the article had no connection with reality whatsoever. Dagbladet wrote about a famine that never existed and a fantastic aid operation that had never occurred (Tvedt 2009:317-318). What is interesting with this incident is not only the fact that one of the biggest newspapers in Norway wrote about something that never happened, but the way in which all this is described, says Tvedt. It is described, not as something exceptional and impressive; it is presented as something quite normal and ordinary. The reaction to the fact that Bondevik had probably saved 80 million people, was nothing more than a shrug. It is seen as quite normal that Norwegian politicians save millions of African lives. This can be seen as sign of how domestic politics is seen as complicated and almost unchangeable for one man or woman, but that same person can go to Africa, or other far away places, as an individual or with donor money or REDD funding, and save millions of lives or millions of square meters of tropical forest. The implications and complexities in these different initiatives are not discussed, nor is the power relation attached to the same processes. Our action is based on the apolitical intervention where we can only do good - as one of my informants told me; “I’m quite sure that we at least do not do any harm with this initiative [REDD]”. But what if REDD ends up as a failed initiative which did more harm than good? What if Norway ends up as the most important facilitator for a project that will favor the huge corporate interest more than it favors the local poor population, “the poorest of the poor” who are, as one informant put it, those who are pushed forward as the real target group in REDD rhetoric? Have these people been asked about this initiative? Do they want it? And will the money reach these people at any stage in the process? The answers are very far from clear.

Examples such as these are important for revealing aspects of how the world is understood in the Norwegian political setting. Very rarely are complexities discussed and we often find examples on how Norwegian initiatives in the global South are seen as easy and uncomplicated involvements where swift change can be achieved. This can be linked to how my different informants all refer to REDD as a more politically realistic alternative compared to other climate measures. It is striking how the idea of political realism is influenced by those whose lives you will affect with the change you want to make. The different self-images of Norway have in common that they mainly lead to practice some distance away from a Norwegian neighbourhood (Leira et al. 2007:23). To create change in these "far-away-places" is, from Norwegian policy maker's standpoint, much easier than to make substantial and sustainable change in the Norwegian society. This is visible if you look at how different Norwegian governments and parliaments have related their decisions about development policies compared to disputes about domestic issues. Tvedt (2009) notes how the Norwegian Parliament historically has several times unanimously voted for development strategies that are made valid for all developing countries. In one illustrating example from 1984/1985 all political parties voted unanimously for one joint strategy for all developing countries. A strategy they argued was based on historical experience. At the same time, the same political parties were arguing about everything else and the Willoch-government had to leave office because of a disagreement on increasing gasoline prices. "At the same time the same politicians in parliament decided upon one joint development strategy for more then 100 countries more than half of the earth's population" (Tvedt 2009:183)[23]. This example shows a simple but important truth about politics in general; The

[23] My own english translation.

World is complex at home, and simple and uncomplicated abroad the further you go from your own political parochialism. In this parochialism it is therefore convenient to move your own political issues out of the "complex" Norwegian context and to "simple" far-away places. In that sense, the tropical rainforest may be one of the most remote places you can go and that's where Norway is heading right now. The phenomenon of moving Norway's own political issues out of the Norwegian context is not new. The origin of Norwegian development aid was, for instance, rooted in an internal conflict in a divided Labour Party in the beginning of the 1950s. The Norwegian membership in NATO and the Korean War was heavily disputed in Norway. A big development initiative in Kerala, India, therefore had a unifying effect both internally in the party but also in the rest of the population (Simensen 2003:42-44).

5.4 The Norwegian paradoxes

There are some paradoxes related to Norway as a global actor. Norwegian foreign policy carries some important tensions and contradictions (Leira et. al 2007:5). These paradoxes are rarely talked about and Norway has in many ways been immune to criticism (Tvedt 2009). A report launched on behalf of the Forum for Development and Environment emphasizes some of these paradoxes (Curtis 2010). Norway is, for example, through the government's Pension Fund, investing in companies abusing human rights and the environment. Norwegian state-owned companies are also involved internationally in similar abuses. Norway is, through its oil industry, responsible for huge amounts of CO2 emissions and is also a strong influential energy actor in states that can be accused for being corrupt, undemocratic and also abusive of human rights Azerbaijan, Algeria, Angola, Iran and Nigeria are all examples of states with Norwegian energy involvement (Curtis 2010:9).. Norway has also, at the same

time as building a reputation as a crucial peace broker, been the world's 20th largest arms exporter over the last thirty years. Norway has also been criticising the World Bank and IMF for imposing privatization and deregulation on developing countries, but is at the same time promoting privatization in other processes, for example when it benefits Norwegian energy companies. These are some examples of what Curtis sees as a Norwegian doublethink and the two faces of Norwegian development and environmental policies (Curtis 2010). I will argue that these paradoxes are especially strong since Norway has established such a strong impression and identity nationally and internationally as a genuine altruistic promoter of peace and development. It is also possible to argue that the altruistic identity has created a better image of Norway. Lodgaard (2002:206) argues that Norway needs to be a large aid donor and peace builder in order to maintain and enhance a positive image internationally. If these two dimensions of Norwegian foreign policy were absent, a more egoistical image of Norway would appear, says Lodgaard (2002:206). Development aid is often introduced in settings where Norwegian involvement can otherwise only be interpreted as negative. This can be argued whether we talk about oil and gas, the arms trade, or climate issues. The fact that the development agenda is often overemphasized only sharpens the paradoxes and makes them even more paradoxical. Norway has, in addition, also gained a lot of success in this positive national branding. This success has made Norway a more prominent international actor in different arenas. With regard to REDD, the Norwegian engagement has placed Norway in a position as a founder. Audun Rosland, the Norwegian forest negotiator, says, for example, that the Norwegian REDD-money has given Norway credibility in the climate negotiations. "It is obvious that this promise has made us the most important industrialized country that has the greatest influence on the negotiations"[24]. The current Norwegian Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, was,

[24] Quoted in Aftenposten 26.11.2009.

together with Gordon Brown (UK), Meles Zenawi (Ethiopia) and Bharrat Jagdeo (Guyana) appointed as a member of a UN high-level advisory group of the UN-Secretary General on climate change financing in March 2010. The Norwegian REDD initiative has thus created a room where Norway can play a more active role in international climate negotiations.

According to Lodgaard (2002) the Norwegian focus on development aid is not only an act of altruism, but also a matter of a nation's own interest. REDD is in this respect gaining influence and prestige for Norway and Norwegian politicians and climate negotiators at the international climate arena. Norway is also in general gaining a lot of positive feedback from the international political environment because of this REDD-initiative. It is therefore an important part of the green and altruistic Norwegian self-image – a continuance of what Lodgaard (2002) points to.

Mark Curtis (2010) concludes quite interestingly that despite Norway's ethical lead on some issues, the unethical list also long and becoming longer. He writes;

> "The leitmotif in Norway's unethical behaviour concerns the promotion of business interests and the failure to restrain and direct them towards promoting human rights. In this respect, Norway has become little different to other rich countries exploiting the planet for their own benefit".

Curtis thereby states that Norway has lost its ethical niche. He places Norway where he says they actually belong: as part of the dominant elite among the world's nations. Norway cannot claim their supposed and constructed differences any more. The only thing that is different is that Norway pretends to be something other than the countries it would be natural to compare themselves with.

What happens after such a straightforward critique and unveiling of the Norwegian paradox? In Norway this sort of fundamental critique, which explores issues outside the dominant discursive blur, is most often only met with silence. The report did not make the front pages and spurred no public debate. The government and the whole southern political system met the report conclusions with the most effective tool: they kept quiet. Nina Witoszek (2010) argues that it is shocking how this unmasking of Norway's two faces disappeared into nothing substantially new. She writes:

> "As we move forward in the 21st century, the Norwegian government and most NGOs have become so entrenched in their "goodness" that they are immune to criticism. Nor do they need intellectuals. The government commissions - and tolerates - critical research not to correct its policy, but to demonstrate to itself its imperial goodness".

The same trend is visible if you look at the Norwegian debate on REDD. The goodness in the initiative masks the paradoxical realities, naivety and enormous difficulties that are entrenched in it. The same dynamic is also visible there; the NGOs are part of the system and are in no need of either a public debate nor critical intellectuals or researchers.

6. The Norwegian REDD-initiative

> "The technology is well known and has been available for thousands of years. Everybody knows how not to cut down a tree"
>
> Jens Stoltenberg, Bali 2007[25]

The now almost legendary comment by Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg at the UNFCCC COP 15 in Bali, Indonesia, was part of the speech where Norway announced their historical ambitions on reducing CO2-emissions from deforestation. The core of the Norwegian ambitions is found in this quote: All we need to do is to pay people not to cut down trees.

6.1 The political situation in Norway

After the election on 12 September 2005, the Stoltenberg II government was appointed. The Stoltenberg Second Cabinet was the first majority government appointed in Norway in twenty years and included the Centre Party, the Labour Party and the Socialist Left Party. It is thus considered as a centre-left government and given the name the Red-Green Coalition. The coalition was re-elected in 2009. The cabinet is dominated by the Labour Party, which now holds 64 out of 169 seats in the parliament and have 12 out of 20 ministers in the new cabinet. The socialist left lost four seats in the parliament after the 2009 election and are now equal with the Centre Party. They both hold 11 seats in the parliament and have four ministers in the cabinet. The Socialist Left Party has thus lost significant negotiating power since the former period when the

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25 http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/smk/aktuelt/taler_og_artikler/statsministeren/statsminister_jens_stoltenberg/2007-4/Tale-til-FNs-klimakonferanse-pa-Bali.html?id=493899

Norwegian REDD-initiative was initiated. The opposition in the parliament consists of the Progress Party, the Conservative Party, the Christian Democratic Party and the Liberal Party.

The Socialist Left Party has been an important part of the policies related to climate and development issues. They still have the Minister of Environment and International Development, Erik Solheim, and have put environmental issues high on their agendas for many years. As we will see later on in this chapter, the support from the Socialist Left Party was important for the creation of a REDD-initiative. The Labour Party is in general more reluctant when it comes to climate efforts. They are concerned about the potential conflict between employment and climate efforts, especially related to the extractive industries offshore and its influence on the whole Norwegian economy. This potential conflict is part of the Norwegian paradoxes.

6.2 The REDD process in Norway

6.2.1 2007 – The climate threat is rediscovered

To understand why the Norwegian climate and forest initiative came about, we have to go back to 2007 when climate once again was on everyone's lips. And it was not only the late indian summer of 2006 that changed, at least temporarily, the public opinion and debate in Norway and elsewhere. Global climate change has been an important issue and on the agenda for more than twenty years, but the debate became a heated one, both internationally and in Norway, in the spring of 2007. The IPCCC-report was published that year, and the year before The Stern Review had also been released. IPCCC had a key message that the climate threat

was more far-reaching and urgent to address than we then knew. The Stern-report told the political leaders that these issues could be solved if we take quick action. It was further argued that this could be done in a cost-effective way. An effort towards halting the deforestation rate was especially highlighted as one of the most cost-effective measures. "Low hanging fruits" became a new term in climate discussions.

Al Gore was, at the same time, touring the world with his Academy Award winning documentary, *An Inconvenient Truth* and book, *An Inconvenient Truth: The Planetary Emergency of Global Warming and What We Can Do About It.* Gore and the IPCCC were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize "for their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, and to lay foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such change".[26] The Prize was handed out in Oslo at the end of 2007, a year which stands out as the year both Norway and the rest of the World became aware of, or rediscovered, climate change as a severe threat to the planet. A way of putting this on the agenda was to give the prize to these two individual and institutional advocates.

6.2.2 Pre-Bali Period

In Norway, this period was dominated by a build-up of political pressure against the government. Both the political opposition in Parliament and the civil society with its environmental NGOs were joining forces to push the government to deliver ambitious climate targets at the upcoming COP-13 conference in Bali, December 2007. This period can therefore be called the Pre-Bali Period. I have

[26] http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/index.html

asked all my informants about the pre-Bali process. There are some events that are reappearing in my interviews with new importance. My informants all put forward the above-discussed Stern Report from 2006 and the IPCC report from 2007 as a crucial scientific basis for the Norwegian political decision process. To save the rainforests was, as mentioned above, seen and emphasized particularly by Sir Nicholas Stern as one of the most alluring and economically efficient measures. REDD was thus seen as a low hanging fruit. The question therefore concerns what lies behind such an assumption.

As far as I could discover through my research, the idea was first launched in a Norwegian context during the work on the NOU 14:2008 "Samstemt for Utvikling" (United for Development). This was an official report and discussion paper prepared on behalf of the government in the period 2006-2008. The idea behind the report was to investigate how Norwegian politics in general affected development in poor countries (NOU14:2008). Both Lars Haltbrekken, who is also the chairman of Friends of the Earth Norway, and Anne K. Grimsrud (The Centre Party) were part of the comittee working on the report. They were, together with Julie Christensen from The Conservative Party, responsible for the working group on climate and energy. According to Grimsrud, the REDD-suggestion was seen as a first step towards a model for climate financing from the rich countries.

6.2.3 The letter from Lars and Lars

Lars Haltbrekken joined forces with RFN and their leader, Lars Løvold. They suggested, in a letter in autumn 2007, a REDD-proposal to the Minister of Finance, Kristin Halvorsen (The Socialist Left Party) and the new Minister of Environment and International Development, Erik Solheim. The proposal that

was launched was based on the cost estimates made by the Stern Review and it was suggested that Norway could offer 10% of the global pot, which in numbers meant NOK 6 billion a year. They also went to the opposition in the parliament, where the Conservative Party found the idea very attractive right from the start. Political adviser for the Conservative Party, Lars Andreas Lunde, explains that the arguments from the Stern Report and the environmental NGOs were important for why they found it attractive. He emphasises how actions to halt deforestation can give big climate gains in proportion to how much means you put into it, and refers to how REDD as the individual measure that can reduce climate emissions by 20 per cent. The Conservative Party saw it as a very efficient climate initiative at a relatively limited cost. Lars A. Lunde continued to explain: "If there is something Norway has, it is money" and saw it as a good idea to use some of the Norwegian oil fortune on a very cost-efficient international climate initiative.

RFN had at this point been working on the issue for a long time. They had already in 2003-2004 been informed, through a cooperating organisation in Brazil (ISA – Instituto Socioambiental), that the linkage between climate and forest was interesting. RFN then gradually realised, based on what was going on in research and different national and international political currents, the role which emissions from deforestation and degradation play in the global emissions. They were also concerned about how the rainforests and its ecosystems are in themselves dependent on a stable climate to be preserved as such. RFN then saw this connection between climate and rainforest and further, the REDD-initiative, as a new tool to achieve what they had been fighting for for almost 20 years. "REDD is a new political agenda that has appeared, and can provide money to protect and save the rainforest", says Nils Hermann Ranum in RFN.

The initiative from the two NGOs therefore originated not only from RFN's contact with cooperating NGOs abroad and the realisation that to connect forest and climate could be a new way to get funding for an issue that was relatively neglected for a long time, but also originated in Lars Haltbrekkens' work with the NOU 14:2008. The letter, often only referred to as "the letter from Lars and Lars", was in many ways perfectly timed, since the government had just started the negotiations towards the Climate Settlement (Klimaforliket) in the parliament. The Climate Settlement is the political compromise on environmental and climate policy between the governing parties and the three oppositional parties: the Conservative Party, the Christian Democratic Party and the Liberal Party[27]. The negotiations took place in autumn 2007, and was signed and settled in January 2008. The mentioned NGOs, RFN and Friends of the Earth Norway, were also working with the opposition in parliament, especially the fraction leader from the Conservative Party, Børge Brende. Based on both conversations with the NGOs and the knowledge from the Stern Review, Brende put forward this suggestion in the negotiations in the energy and environment fractions in the parliament. It was in this fraction that the three opposition parties tried to agree on a common platform before the negotiations with the government. The idea was based on almost the same assumptions as the suggestion by the NGOs. The Stern Review had suggested that deforestation could be halted, if you used approximately $10 billion a year, over a period of 5 years. $10 billion dollars, approximately NOK 60 billion, was then visualised as a transfer from the rich countries in the world to tropical rainforest countries. The logic was then that the four big Nordic countries, as rich countries of the world, participated with 20% of this amount, i.e. NOK 12 billion. The Norwegian contribution was therefore NOK 3 billion

[27] The Progress Party was not included in the climate negotiations, but some of my informants argue that they probably would have supported a REDD-initiative, despite their general scepticism to aid.

over a five year period. This was half of what the NGOs suggested be granted by Norway, but still a relatively large amount of money. NOK 3 billion is 10 % of the total aid budget.

One element that is worth mentioning from the negotiations is that there was some dissent between the government and the opposition. One issue was the tempo of the appropriations. The government was, according to Lars Andreas Lunde in The Conservative Party, more concerned and eager about putting up institutions and liable structures before actual money was granted. The opposition was more impatient and pushed for granting of money from day one. This condition was accepted. Another demand, especially put forward by the Christian Democratic Party, was that this REDD money should be in addition to existing aid; REDD-funding should not come at the expense of the fight against poverty. This was accepted in principle; REDD is seen as part of the regular aid budget but is considered as additional and will not come at the expense of regular aid. But a reduction in other aid funding in the coming years could then create a new political debate on REDD vs. regular aid efforts. The aid NGO, Norwegian Church Aid, is concerned about this combination of aid and climate efforts. They see REDD as a climate and environment initiative and that it therefore should be under the environment budget. Erik Solheim's reply to this is that REDD is "very good environmental protection, but also good development aid. We are not taking anything from healthcare, education or other aid initiatives. Rainforest comes on top"[28].

[28] Original quote from VG 20.05.2010: Satsning på regnskog er meget godt miljøvern, men også god utviklingshjelp. Vi tar ikke fem øre fra helse, utdanning og annet innen bistand. Regnskog kommer på toppen.

6.2.4 The COP 13 conference and Stoltenberg's transformation

The suggestion by Brende was approved by the three parties and put forward in the negotiations with the government, where it seems that the Socialist Left Party was the strongest advocater of a similar suggestion. On Thursday 13th of December 2007, during Prime Minister Stoltenberg's speech at the COP 13 conference, the proposed demands from the opposition were met. My informants, especially in the NGOs, all expressed surprise over the amount of money promised. They imagined that it would be far less then they had suggested. Processes like these also tend to take several years, from when the suggestion is put forward to the actual granting of money. In REDD's case it both went really fast - about three months - and the money the government granted was more than they could have ever dreamed of. This is really unusual for such processes.

It is difficult to obtain detailed information, but one thing that has come up through my interviews and also in media is the way REDD was pushed forward by The Socialist Left Party in the government. The Labour Party and Prime Minister Stoltenberg were, according to some sources, against the suggestion at first. Lars Haltbrekken says that from what he knows, Stoltenberg opposed the suggestion until the last minute. It was the Socialist Left Party and the Minister of Finance, Kristin Halvorsen, and the Minister of Environment and International Development, Erik Solheim that were first contacted by the NGOs, and with their support, combined with pressure from the opposition in the parliament; it was then probably quite difficult for AP to turn the initiative down. It is interesting therefore, to see how Stoltenberg managed to turn his scepticism to eager enthusiasm throughout the fall of 2007. What could have made this turning point in Stoltenberg's way of reasoning? Was it the pressure inside the government from a convinced Minister of Finance from the Socialist Left Party, Halvorsen,

and an eager new “Super Minister”, Solheim, in the Ministry of Environment also responsible for international development? Was it the pressure from the NGOs, or was it, as one informant suggested, actually the Ministry of Finance who saw this as a nice opportunity to facilitate the inclusion of forests in a future offset-market? And how can we understand how rainforests in a couple of months in 2007 suddenly became a close to number one international concern for Norway? What was so attractive about it, that an almost united parliament, bureaucracy and civil society embraced such a vague and challenging initiative? Or was everyone really as impressively optimistic as seen on the surface?

6.2.5 The institutional process

In spring 2008 the government was thus in need of an institutional framework for the initiative. A project group was appointed in April, and it was situated in the Ministry of the Environment (Miljøverndepartementet - MD). This group is now referred to as the Climate and Forest Secretariat (Klima og Skog Sekreteriatet - KOS). When the location of KOS was planned, there were several alternatives, but it was decided that the Ministry of the Environment would house the secretariat. My informants have commented that this location was anything but obvious and the decision was not made without discussion. It could have been placed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Utenriksdepartementet - UD) where the funding is channeled, but may be more natural in the Norwegian Agency for Development and Cooperation (NORAD). It has been indicated that this conflict was troublesome and went to the top of the different ministries to be decided. It can also be connected with the old conflict-ridden relationship between NORAD and UD. A reform in 2003 initiated by then Minister of Development, Hilde Frafjord Johnson, left the agency reorganised and wing-clipped when many of its employees were transferred to UD and many of its functions were transferred to the embassies. The relationship between Ministries and agencies has often been

characterised by a dynamic power struggle where the agencies are more or less free-speaking organs in different historical contexts. It is said that Frafjord Johnson wanted more control over NORAD, which at that period was headed by, as some would say, a strong leader, Tove Strand (1997-2005).

The composition of the secretariat is interesting in itself. Hans Brattskar was appointed leader of the secretariat. He came from the UD and is a former ambassador in Sri Lanka. The rest of the group is composed of people from UD, MD, businesses, NGOs and research institutions. No one was recruited from NORAD - something that, considering the focus on development aid, sustainable win-win-win solutions and pro-poor and indigenous development would perhaps seem natural. Not to say that NORAD did not take part in the process. They take part and are now responsible for the allocation of funding to the NGO. The overall impression is nevertheless that they are left somehow in the outskirts of the processes in the initiative. "Where we would have liked to be a substantial contributing part, we sometimes felt that we were more like event arrangers" says one aid bureaucrat.

6.2.6 An unusually swift process

The process was at this stage moving really fast. Some argued that it was too fast. Jens Stoltenberg's trip to Brazil was already planned for mid-September of 2008 and NORAD was asked in May to put together a team who could find out if it was appropriate to move on with Brazil. The first answer was no, and that if certain actions were not taken, money over the aid budget could not be used. The things that had to be done in Brazil were not done in time, so they were lagging behind slightly. The same process had to be done with the Congo Basin Fund. NORAD had talks with the African Development Bank only ten days before

Stoltenberg signed the deal with Gordon Brown in London. "You just had to rush around and make desk studies", one of my informants said. All this was before KOS really was up and running. When KOS started to become operative, most of the activity was transferred to KOS.

During this process a lot of the work was done after the fact. In the case of Guyana, the Minister of Environment and International Development had decided to sign the deal before the formal decision document was even made. These sorts of documents usually have to go through the system in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before they are settled. This was also the case in Brazil where the Prime Minister signed the deal before the official decision document was ready. One Norwegian aid bureaucrat uses this as an example of how this initiative is a top-down political driven initiative where the system has to adjust in retrospect. In many cases the bureaucracy felt more like they were 'rubber stamping' than being actual policy designers. The bureaucracy then felt that they were lagging behind the political decisions which came from the top level. "This is unique in this context", said one of my informants.

These small examples show how incredibly and unusually fast the Norwegian REDD-process has gone. In less than a year, forest and climate had climbed from the bottom to the top of the ladder of importance in Norwegian climate and development policies. The Norwegian REDD-initiative is the biggest single initiative in Norwegian development aid and amounts to almost 10 per cent of the regular aid budget[29]. It is also visible through my interviews how this initiative was top-driven, with no deep foundation in the bureaucracy. "There were not

[29] See Jørn Stave from NORAD in Aftenposten: http://www.aftenposten.no/klima/article3662518.ece

many people involved in making a first note on this" says one Norwegian aid-bureaucrat. The informant admits also that such an initiative never would have come from the bureaucracy. Every normal aid reaction would become visible and turn the initiative down, says an interviewee. It is also interesting to see how NORAD, with its expertise on development and aid issues, was left out of the actual implementation of the initiative quite early on. KOS was located in MD and the money came from UD. NORAD was left with the allocation of NGO funding. They also have an advisory role towards UD and KOS.

Most of those I interviewed see more or less the same nightmare scenarios for the REDD-future, but thus at the same as they are acknowledging them, they are similarly insistent on the notion that we have no choice but to try; and are pragmatic optimists.Allthough NORAD is the most critical articulated voice, people in KOS are also in agreement with NORADs concerns; the importance of socio-economic measures, focus on alternative livelihoods, respect local and indigenous rights etc; all this has to be a central part of REDD-policies, says Inger Næss in KOS. KOS therefore see the problems, but they do not see it as an argument for not trying. Perhaps bureaucratic pragmatism is an appropriate term to label this phenomenon with. The common way of phrasing their arguments is: "we know it's difficult, but we have no choice but to try". This way of phrasing suggess that their choices are limited by political pressure from above and, as loyal bureaucrats, they are left with no choice then but to work in the direction their political leaders, or "masters", are pointing. Solheim is eager to deliver in this field and is often referring to how there is no time to waste and that we can't wait: "I totally agree (…) that this is urgent. We can not wait until "the perfect monitoring system" is ready before we give money to countries that wish

to reduce their deforestation"[30] Or: "There is still more carbon in forests than in the atmosphere, and we have no alternative but to try to keep it there."[31].

6.2.7 Allocation of Norwegian funds

The allocation of funds through the Norwegian climate and forest initiative started in 2008 and is scheduled to increase every year. The funds are distributed through both multilateral institutions and bilateral agreements. The World Bank-led Forest Investment Programme (FIP) and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) are, together with the UN-REDD Programme and Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF), the main multilateral recipients of funds. Tanzania, Guyana and Brazil have bilateral agreements. There are also some allocations to civil society[32]. In the UN-REDD programme there are, as aforementioned, nine pilot countries: namely, Tanzania, Zambia, DR Congo, Indonesia, Papua New-Guinea, Vietnam, Paraguay, Panama and Bolivia. Some of these countries are almost entirely new partners for Norway. Papua New-Guinea, Congo and Guyana in particular are examples of countries in which Norway historically has not had much involvement and thus has a lack of knowledge and local contact points. The REDD-initiative has therefore led Norway in the opposite direction to their development goal of fewer engagement areas and fewer partners. The Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) peer review of Norwegian development cooperation from 2008 criticised Norway for not focusing on a manageable number of priorities. They write, for example: "Norway needs to ensure that the process of identifying objectives is strategic and well managed,

[30] Original quote in Dagens Næringsliv 09.09.2008: Jeg er helt enig med Kjetil B. Alstadheim i at dette haster. Vi kan ikke vente på at "det perfekte overvåkingssystemet" er på plass før vi gir støtte til land som ønsker å redusere sin avskoging.

[31] http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-green/2009/oct/08/redd-norway-brazil-climate-changeF

[32] See attachment 1 and 2 for more detailed information.

both centrally and at partner country level. The process must lead to a manageable number of clear and focused priorities. Norway will need to resist the temptation to add new ad hoc initiatives to an ever-expanding list of priorities"[33]. The concern in the Norwegian parliament that the geographical dispersal of new projects can result in more thinly distributed aid and less substantial impact is also commented upon in the same report. At the same time REDD funding is often not given to the poorest countries, and this is also in contrast with the government's aim to concentrate allocations more directly to the poorest of the poor. This shift away from the poverty focus from the current administration has been criticised by both development NGOs and researchers[34].

6.3 REDD and poverty reduction

The question of whether REDD is a good tool for poverty reduction or not, is central to what some describe as tension between the institutions. The current leader of the project group, Hans Brattskar, is at first a bit reluctant to acknowledge a tension but later explains the different standpoints as follows:

> "Our challenge is to explain how this [REDD] fits together with traditional development aid. Are climate and forest efforts something different than traditional Norwegian aid? Is this poverty oriented? Some will say yes, this is different, since we aim to pay for results. Others would question whether this is this the same as giving money to schools and healthcare. I would say that this is very useful and poverty oriented aid, because those who first will live with the consequences of the lack of water and fertile soil when the climate changes are the poorest of the poor. Standing forests reduce the probability of dangerous

[33] http://www.oecd.org/document/47/0,3343,en_2649_34603_41833003_1_1_1_1,00.html

[34] See for example: Tvedten, Inge (2010): Bistandens Hamskifte. http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikker/article3498504.ece.

> climate change and protect water resources and against soil erosion, and are essential for the livelihoods of many poor people. So in this way, REDD is also poverty orientated".

Brattskar thinks that these discussions around whether REDD is also development aid, which is found both inside and outside of the bureaucracy as well as internationally, come up because people are afraid that REDD will come at the expense of regular aid-funding. The above quote from Brattskar is then partly connected to the dissent from the opposition in the climate settlement. He is still, however, quite clear; that REDD is very useful and poverty oriented aid. This is probably not completely agreed upon by NORAD. I in turn, find it interesting how poverty so often is used as a central element in REDD-rhetoric. The question is whether the poor people in tropical areas are welcoming and wanting such an initiative, know about their central part in REDD-discussions and justifications or know what REDD actually is. And are we so sure that this huge allocation of funding will actually reach the people living in these often very remote areas of the world?

A term that is often used when talking about REDD is "high risk sport". For example, Hans Olav Ibrekk, a Policy Director in NORAD says: "This will be extremely challenging to establish and operationalise, and it is a great risk. What we have done is a high risk sport, but as I mentioned before it was our masters who sent us in this direction". Ibrekk calls REDD a high risk sport because we are not sure it will work, and perhaps Norway will end up spending a lot of money and prestige on a complete failure. Put this can also be seen from a poverty perspective and a timely question is then: High risk sport for whom? Pål Vedeld, professor at NORAGRIC, analysed REDD from a poverty perspective and said in an interview: "Brattskar and [his people] (…) talk about this as some

sort of risk sport. It is no risk sport; it is about life and death for the people involved. (…) This is no sport; it is every day life for poor people in developing countries". It is important to note that Ibrekk and Vedeld are not opposed on this issue. Vedeld sees NORAD as the institutional advocator of this poverty perspective. He sees how Brattskar and the other people working in KOS often lack perspectives on poverty.

In the win-win-win and inclusive rhetoric surrounding REDD, poverty issues are only seen as a possible co-benefit. But, according to Vedeld and others a REDD-initiative can also have negative impact on the situation for already marginalised people. Vatn et al. (2009) see many different obstacles for a triple dividend success. They first note that we have to keep in mind that if the money allocated through REDD is no more than the opportunity cost, there will be no actual net benefit. This makes a poverty alleviation strategy in REDD less comprehensible. There are, nevertheless, also many obstacles to reaching the poorest people in remote forest areas. Since REDD-payments are connected to property rights, money could end up at levels above the poorest of the poor who are often used in REDD-rhetoric. If we look at the history of other conservation programmes and CDM projects, the exclusion of local communities could also be a possible outcome. These processes contribute to marginalisation and poverty more than pro-poor development. Similar programmes to secure ecosystem services have shown that they can lead to reduced future livelihood opportunities for rural poor people. The resources made less available by programmes such as these are often hard for poor people to replace (Vatn et al. 2009:34). They also add that REDD, with a substantial flow of money from the global North to the global South and connected to demand for land, will increase land prices and in turn make it hard for poor people to get access to land. Vatn et al. (2009:vii) are then arguing that a pro-poor policy has to be designed for REDD. It is therefore natural to ask why

the expertise on pro-poor development in NORAD is only partially included in Norwegian REDD-strategies, why so few people with a development background sit in KOS and why independent research is not prioritised.

6.4 Expensive and difficult, not cheap and easy

"It is through initiatives against deforestation that we will get the biggest, quickest and cheapest cuts"

Jens Stoltenberg, 25.05.2010[35]

Returning to my informants in the Norwegian bureaucracy, they are all, as mentioned earlier, using the Stern Report as an important foundational knowledge base and argument for why the initiative came about. As already noted, the report states that efforts towards stopping deforestation and degradation could be the most cost effective tool to use against climate change. REDD is therefore seen by Jens Stoltenberg, as cheap, quick and easy – a so-called low hanging fruit. The Stern Report is nevertheless disputed and Arild Vatn at NORAGRIC explains in an interview how it is based on a relatively simple calculation. He denies the assumption that REDD will be easy and cheap. "At least it's not easy", he says. "It is very demanding to establish systems to pay for reduced deforestation."

While my informants acknowledge the report's importance, they all simultaneously argue against such easy fix assumptions. Inger Næss in KOS says that REDD will not be quick, but the most cost efficient compared to other measures. She adds that it will not be easy, but we do not have any

[35] Quote from the Oslo Climate and Forest Conference 2010.

alternative – we have to try. Thus, not quick, not easy, but the most politically realistic aim Norway can achieve in climate politics. Hans Brattskar underlines that; "it is wrong to say that this [REDD] is cheap and easy, it is expensive and difficult, but it is possible to do it". This is the understanding that has been gained and developed over time. After the first rush of enthusiasm reality had then sunk in and it has become clear that this will be neither cheap nor quick and easy. The paradox is that during the same period of acknowledging how difficult this will be, REDD has achieved broader and increasing support. Even Erik Solheim, responding to criticism in the Guardian,[36] says he is well aware of this not being easy: "I have no illusions this will be easy; however, when it comes to greenhouse gases, there is no such thing as business as usual – either we deal with this together, or the battle against climate change will be lost". Solheim is here putting up a somewhat different image of REDD than we can find in Stoltenberg's rhetoric. There is therefore some divergence in how the two ministers talks about the REDD-initiative.

As mentioned above, the argument which follows is that, even though REDD could end up as both expensive and difficult, that cannot be a good argument for not trying. As Inger Næss said: "it will not be easy, but we do not have any alternative – we have to try". Per Mogstad at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs says: "because something is difficult that is not a valid reason for not trying to do something about it". The NGOs are also on the same track here. Nils H. Ranum at RFN says, for example, that it is far from certain that REDD will succeed, but we still have to try. "Yes it is complicated and it will take some time and it is not certain that it will succeed either" Ranum maintains. Lars Haltbrekken at Friends of the Earth Norway says there is a lot in the climate context that can end up

[36] http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-green/2009/oct/08/redd-norway-brazil-climate-change

being things we do not like, but that cannot be a good reason for not doing it. This is therefore the consistent argument used by both bureaucrats and NGO-activists. In the bureaucrats' case, we see a combination of political instructions and climate reasoning behind the argument. The environmental NGOs stress how the climate threat forces us to take rapid action, but both actors argue in support of poverty reduction and development.

It is also important to my informants to emphasize that REDD is still a learning process. They argue that there will be failures in all attempts to create international cooperation in new areas. We therefore have to start this difficult task, and try and sometimes not succeed. There is no recipe on this, but we work with international actors with important related competence and do our best to make our common efforts work, says Hans Brattskar. RFN also sees the Norwegian REDD-initiative as a learning process. Nils Hermann Ranum maintains that this initiative is simply trying out which projects work and which do not. It is therefore quite impossible to grasp what the project will end up being, and therefore even more difficult to create critical argumentation around it. But this may also be part of the answer to why so many different actors have and still are in support of REDD: they all have different dreams of what it could turn out to be (including, for some, a 'market-based' vision). It may therefore be important to keep the project at this level for a longer period, so that some of the actors will not end up with broken dreams. This way of talking about the initiative is therefore both keeping different dreams alive and making it harder to argue critically against it.

6.5 Political realism

Political realism is a central point upon which many of my informants try to explain why Norway saw REDD as an attractive idea. This is closely connected to the cost-efficiency argument from the Stern Report. Inger Næss says for example: ”within political realism this [REDD] is one of the things we can do which will give the quickest results, and in that context, compared to other initiatives, it is cost-efficient”. Lars Andreas Lunde, the political advisor for the Conservative Party is also on this track. He explains that REDD is “actually more cost-efficient than many of the measures we have to take in Norway. Many of the Norwegian measures will be terribly expensive. The rainforest is thus an example of a measure that has a significant effect and is at the same time not expensive in comparison with Norwegian measures”.

But what lies beyond this idea about cost-efficiency in the Stern Report? The report has met different types of critique. One of the most vocalised has been from its own dominating discipline, the economists. They argue that the report overestimates the present value of the costs of climate change and uses the wrong type of discount rate. I will nevertheless leave this issue aside and focus on a more fundamental critique which can also be extended to a broader critique on what we see as both cost efficient and politically realistic change. Arild Vatn at NORAGRIC explains in an interview that the argument on how cheap this will be is based on simplistic ideas about cost efficiency. “To the extent that REDD is low cost compared to other climate measures, it is not least because poor people sell cheap”, says Vatn.

> “Although using land to produce food is of vital interest for them, the value of their production in monetary/dollar terms is very low (…). So if we buy a hectare of forest land in Africa to protect it, we do not need to pay much. This is so, even

> if the alternative is to produce food that people need. Because African farmers are poor, land has low 'value'".

The fact that the people who will be affected by and are central in different REDD-strategies are poor is therefore influencing the results from the Stern Report that show that this is a cheap and cost efficient climate measure. Looking behind the logic of cost efficiency reveals a relationship between poverty and wealth that is striking. Thus, behind ideas about political realism and cost efficiency lies the very aspect of distribution of wealth and poverty. Both why REDD is fronted as a low hanging carbon fruit and what REDD will look like in the end is deeply imbedded in the matter of which people it is that are affected by different features of the initiatives and where they are placed in different hierarchies of wealth and inclusion in the global economy. It is within this context that we have to place Næss' and Lunde's statements on political realism and cost-efficiency, and consequently also the whole Norwegian reasoning around REDD.

6.6 Who to blame, whom to pay?

There is little reliableinformation on the different drivers behind deforestation, but what we know is that there are huge geographical differences among a diversified tropical hemisphere. In the tropical forests of Guyana the mining industries are the main threat. In Brazil the most important drivers are soy and meat production. In Indonesia, Malaysia and Papua New Guinea it is a combination of plantations (palm oil or paper production) and large-scale logging. A vast deforestation in Africa has yet not occurred, but we can find many examples of degradation. These are all mainly industrial drivers, but in all regions you can also find more or less substantial deforestation resulting from local needs for firewood, grazing land and slash and burn farming. These

different drivers are very diverse, complex and interconnected. It is therefore difficult to single out who to blame and then again whom to pay in the REDD-architecture. The trend is, however, that poor forest dwellers are often targeted. The signals sent out, for example, from UN-REDD activities in Indonesia show that it is several millions of subsistence farmers in Sulawesi who are being targeted, not any of the few but powerful industrial drivers. Both NORAD and RFN are critical to this REDD-development. Ibrekk in NORAD is asking why UN-REDD targets subsistence farmers at Sulawesi when it is the big palm oil plantations and paper mills that should be targeted. Ibrekk is therefore very often highlighting the need to focus on the political economy in REDD-politics, referring to the power structures behind the different decisions made in the REDD-process. In the case of Indonesia it may seem clear that the interests of the big corporate industries and the close connection between the government and these interests has dominated the decision making process. On a larger scale, such a focus must also realise how neoliberal ideas and interests are influencing the international process on REDD. It is important to be aware of these neoliberal ideas and practices, which I presented in the theory chapter, that have dominated conservation and development for the last few decades.

Nils Hermann Ranum at the RFN is also worried about this development. He says that there are signals that indicate that many countries want to target the poorest small-scale farmers. The main reason behind this is not that this is easy, because it is not, Ranum says. He thinks this is because the subsistence farmers are seen as a harmless target group and they will never challenge, for example, the Indonesian government in any way, “but if the plantation industry or the logging industry is targeted the same government would very soon end up in a conflict with themselves or someone they know very well. This is because of the penetrating system of corruption you can find in Indonesia”. There are many

difficulties related to targeting the millions of subsistence farmers. First, it is a very heterogeneous group and therefore difficult to both change their way of living and to have a good communication with. Secondly, it is not obvious that these are the ones who actually are the main drivers behind deforestation, neither historically nor in the future. As Ranum mentions, slash-and-burn farming can actually be a sustainable and carbon neutral use of the forest. It was not this which left Sumatra completely ruined and without any forest. "The plantation and the logging industry did that", he argues.

So the paradox/dilemma is as follows: the poor tropical forest dwellers are both deeply embedded in the Norwegian REDD-rhetoric and also targeted in many pilot REDD-initiatives. But confronted with forest realities in Indonesia, three million subsistence farmers are neither the easiest target group for changing forest-use practises, nor are they the actual key drivers behind deforestation in Indonesia.

6.7 Norway – A mediator between the Global North and South

Another interesting dimension in my empirical data is how my informants see Norway as a negotiating actor between the global North and South. In a relative extension of "The Regime of Goodness" and "The Land of Difference", my informants are always referring to Norway as somewhere between the global North and South. Brattskar refers to how Norway has shown leadership in the climate negotiations on REDD and that Norway is a promoter of important issues such as stakeholder involvement and safeguards against conversion of natural forests. He continues explaining two concrete demands developing countries are putting forward in the international REDD debate; how REDD-funding can not

be given at the expense of regular aid-funding nor at the expense of climate-efforts in developed countries. These viewpoints are in line with the Norwegian stance on these issues. Norway has nevertheless not delivered on national climate targets, but the demands from developing countries are aimed at developed countries in general. In this case Norway regards itself as only having a small part of this global responsibilty.

Lars Haltbrekken also refers to this when discussing what sort of advantage Norway has in succeeding with its REDD-initiative. He says that we have earned a lot of money while emitting climate gases. That is why we owe it to the world to put a small amount of our money into initiatives like REDD. But he adds one more Norwegian advantage; Norway has more confidence internationally since we are not part of any of the power blocks in the world and can therefore have a more independent voice. Interestingly enough, Haltbrekken is here explicitly placing Norway on the outside of the power blocks of the world; more independent and with more international confidence from developing countries. These are the same power blocks that Nustad (2003) is arguing that Norway has to be seen as an active member of. This belief that Haltbrekken is putting forward is very representative in the rhetoric about Norway as a humanitarian superpower and fits perfectly with the earlier mentioned quotes in Witozsek's (2010) article where Norway is seen as small, different and impeccable. The different actors see a Norway that is operating freely, independently and altruistically in a space outside the dominating power blocks - a seemingly apolitical space where we can speak with a golden tongue to defend a global good. The split in the tongue is nevertheless not revealed.

6.8 REDD and carbon markets

One of these ambiguities regards what sort of initiative REDD will be in the end. Many influential actors see REDD as a bridge towards bringing forest into a new market mechanism. Michael Jenkins, the president of the international but Washington based NGO, Forest Trends, explains in an interview[37] that COP 15 was a huge disappointment, not only for environmentalist and policy makers, but also for the carbon market and a lot of the big financial institutions. The only interesting thing that came out of Copenhagen, he says, was "that forestry became the "Promised Land". It is especially ironic since three years ago forestry was in the same category as nuclear, you couldn't trade it (…) and now, coming out of Copenhagen, forests were one bright light that I think will translate into an agreement on forest at the next COP". He further sees how, at this place in the process, public finance has to be a bridge between where we are today and towards a future where significant private sector involvement is in place. The public initiative - which Jenkins calls public investment in forest and climate – not development aid, will thus be a facilitator for a future, more market based solution. Jenkins is certain that we are in a period with growing investment in forest and climate. There is no question that REDD will become part of an eventual market system, he says. The question is what this market will look like, and which institutions and countries will take part.

The Norwegian government is not denying such a statement; but they stress that in the current situation REDD is not seen as a so-called offset mechanism, and at the same time adds that no one knows what will happen after 2012. The Minister for Environment and International Development, Erik Solheim, partly agrees with

[37] http://print.news.mongabay.com/2010/0503-michael_jenkins_interview.html

Jenkins. Solheim explains[38] that Norway, at the next COP meeting in Mexico, will offer support to start forest conservation with public funds, to later turn to market solutions. "In the longer term market solutions can become relevant to raise funds from the private sector". Solheim is thus not rejecting market solutions in the long run, but "REDD is today seen as an altruistic initiative to protect and sustain global goods, funded with money which is not giving us anything in return in terms of national of carbon accounting" said Hans Brattskar in my interview. He added that one important issue now is to create more enthusiasm around REDD and a hope for getting REDD included in a new climate regime. There are some contradictions here. The big question is how and when will REDD transform itself from an altruistic development initiative and into a market based offset mechanism? What will then happen to the new, unusual alliances?

The NGOs, who have enthusiastically supported and partly initiated the Norwegian REDD-initiative, are, however, totally rejecting a scenario in which REDD becomes an offset mechanism. Nils Herrmann Ranum in RFN thinks it is irresponsible to include rainforest protection in an offset mechanism where rich countries can avoid cutting emissions in their own countries if they pay for forest protection in the South. He is certain that this doesn't necessarily have to happen, "but if it does happen would that be very sad and then we have to try and fight it", says Ranum. Lars Haltbrekken at Friends of the Earth Norway says that they are in disagreement with the Norwegian government on this issue, and that there will be a fight over this sometime in the future. Truls Gulowsen at Greenpeace Norway sees a great difference between what Norway writes, what the Norwegian forest experts see and what Jens Stoltenberg really wants and says

[38] Ny Tid 16.04.2010.

about REDD. Stoltenberg is in his rhetoric close to a market based forest approach. Gulowsen sees himself as an optimist and thinks that the Norwegian initiative is made in support of preserving a global good, but adds at same time that it can not be ruled out that Norway will demand something in return some time in the future. "If Stoltenberg uses REDD as a method of getting cheap climate quotas, there are many people who will feel deceived", concluded Gulowsen.

There therefore exists a certain degree of discrepancy in the different actors' visions for a future REDD-regime. On the one hand you have the international carbon market and different states such as the USA and Australia who see the latest REDD development as a "Promised Land" for a new offset mechanism, and you also have Norwegian policy makers who probably have conflicting visions about how close they want REDD to move to turn into an offset mechanism. In addition, you have the Norwegian NGOs who will feel deceived if REDD ends up as new system to continue polluting. And finally you have the developing countries themselves, and how they envision a future REDD-regime.

6.9 No Critique

> "Today, the NGOs are not a corrective. I do not have any bruises on my leg, and I want to have bruises on my leg"
>
> Hans Olav Ibrekk , NORAD.

By investigating the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative it has become clear that the way the initiative was presented in the beginning, for example by Prime Minister Stoltenberg in Bali 2007, has clear limitations and can also be accused of being detached from reality. His comment about how we all have the

technology to not cut down trees is, at this stage in the process, only made fun of[39]. It has become clear that REDD-initiatives around the world will be difficult, expensive and take a long time to develop and accomplish. In addition, you have other debates about REDD and the carbon market and the neoliberal dimension in conservation.

The fact that the bureaucrats acknowledge this is interesting, but even more interesting is that there are few critical voices towards the initiative. A public debate is almost invisible. The natural question will therefore be: why? It is natural to relate this to the close connection between the KOS-secretariat and the NGOs who normally serve the role of watchdogs in a democracy. Terje Tvedt (2003) has described this thoroughly in his books on Norwegian development policies and what he sees as a Southern Political System. He describes a system of national corporativism where the claimed civil society is more closely linked to bureaucracy than the word "civil" actually suggests. Tvedt (2009:34) argues that the system is marked by close ties between different civil and public actors in the system. These ties are again eased by elite circulation, where few people circulate between important jobs in the system, where the same people allocate resources inside the system without transparency.

One informant has also suggested that the current government has unusually close ties to the Norwegian civil society. The fact that The Socialist Left Party is in government and has the Minister for Environment and International Development, has made it excettionally easy for civil society to obtain an

[39] This was, for instance, observed at a REDD conference arranged at Litteraturhuset in April 2010, where different REDD actors were part of a panel debate on REDD.

audience. The people working in the NGOs are seen as a core group for the party. In the case of the Norwegian REDD initiative, these central environmental NGOs have had good political access and been listened to. In addition, they have been granted a lot of money. A 2009 overview of NGO funding reveals that the RFN and WWF Norway have grown very rapid in a few years. From 1999 – 2009 RFN's aid grant has increased from NOK 12 million to NOK 82.9 million. WWF aid grants increased from NOK 5 million to NOK 56,5 million.[40]

My informants confirm that close connections exists, and some are more critical to this phenomenon than others. Once again, it is NORAD which has a critical position. Hans Olav Ibrekk in NORAD, explains the love-hate relationship that usually exists between NORAD and the Norwegian civil society, where the NGOs' comment on what NORAD does. In the case of REDD, however, these organisations are invisible to NORAD:

> "In NORAD we are worried about the fact that we do not see the civil society as taking corrective measures against what we do. I have told the [Norwegian] NGOs directly, in conversations like this one, that before, my leg was always full of bruises since I was kicked continuously by the NGOs. Today the NGOs are not a corrective. I do not have any bruises on my leg, and I want to have bruises on my leg, that drives our agenda too. (…) The NGOs are not exercising their critical role today; at least I do not see them. We miss that in NORAD. We miss it and feel that now that we are the ones who have to pose the critical questions"

NORAD is consequently feeling relatively alone in confronting the REDD-system in a corrective capacity. In principle, NORAD is supposed to provide independent, evidence-based advice to UD and the Norwgeian embassies abroad.

[40] Development Today 9-2009.

Ibrekk is here describing his frustration over the situation. It is difficult to know how this frustration can be understood. One of the questions is whether critical comments from NORAD are only invisible because they are not directly involved in the initiative. Or if they are actually not visible to anyone, because all the other actors are happy with the status quo and do not see the need to act as corrector and watchdog. One suggestion is that the connection between the involved NGOs, in this case especially the environment NGOs, is so close that the critique is happening behind closed doors; and that these doors are closed to NORAD as well as the rest of the public. A third suggestion is that there exists some critique within the system, but because they are so closely involved in the Norwegian REDD-initiative the critique is not as harsh as it would have been if they had chosen to stay outside the process.

My informants indicate that public debate about complicated issues like REDD is not always the best for the case. Inger Næss is for instance saying that there is more internal discussions and critique than we can see in the Norwegian media. She describes the relation to the NGOs as close and constructive. The NGOs are often invited to meetings and seminars and join KOS-delegations on fieldtrips, example to Guyana and DR Congo. They are also often in contact by email, for airing views back and forward and exchanging information. She thinks the NGOs feel that they are included in the process in a good way:

> "If we get critique from the NGOs, as today from RFN, about concerns for corruption or indigenous rights then this is articulated in such a way that it is good and constructive. . That is the role of NGOs , to be a watchdog and critical. That is a corrective we want to have"

As we see, Næss is happy with the way the NGOs operate as a watchdog. And she does not agree with the allegation put forward that there are too close ties

between the KOS administration and the NGOs. She prefers direct internal critique from the NGOs.

The question then is how all of this is seen from the NGOs' standpoint? Nils Herrmann Ranum in RFN agrees with Næss that there are some messages that are complicated to get through in a public debate. At the same time he admits that there is obviously a pain threshold on what they can accept from the Norwegian government. He add that until now the Norwegian positions has been one of the best compared to other countries such as Australia and the US which are both wanting a more offset oriented initiative. Norway wants a broader definition of forest and sees forest as a part of a future carbon marked. Norway and RFN disagree on these two issues. Ranum do not see the close relation between RFN and KOS as servile:

> "If you actually see what we have done it is hard to accuse TRF to be a servile organisation who jumps every time Solheim or any of his employees tell us to do so. I think that's really hard to document, but I think it is very easy for me to document the opposite"

While Ranum refuse that RFN is a servile organisation, he is more eager talking about their actual political influence: "We believe that RFN is listened to and taken serious, mainly because we have many years of experience and a wide network of partners working in key countries for the Norwegian government's climate and forest initiative. We have close contact with the unit that is working with this from day to day, and have insisted on having that position". He adds that TRF at the same time actually are one of the few milieus that have in-depth competence on forest in Norway. "Despite that it is not humble to say this, I

believe RFN in many ways knows more about tropical rainforests and how important it is for forest-dependent peoples than the Norwegian government/authorities does", says Ranum. RFN has over twenty years' background from working in these, for Norway, new areas of the world. Expertise and local connections and contacts in countries such as Papua New Guinea, DR. Congo and Guyana are rare in Norway. RFN's expertise is therefore valuable for the KOS-secretariat. So, where some see the close connection between RFN and KOS as a sign of servility, the two actors themselves see it as a constructive win-win situation where expertise and networks are traded for political influence and participation and a source of information exchange. I would nevertheless argue that there are some disturbing signs of power arrogance in their rhetoric. This is especially visible when they express their worries that there are messages that are too complicated to put into a public debate.

Despite Ranum's emphasis on a good and dynamic relationship between RFN and KOS, he is still aware of the lack of public debate: "There is really not a lot of discussion on this issue in Norway right now", and this is a risk for such an important issue, he says. But quickly adds that the international debate should not be exaggerated: "There are a few good articles every now and then in the papers like Guardian, New York Times and BBC, but the actual problem is that there in general are a lack of public discussion around REDD".

This does seem to be the case. There is very little discussion about REDD in general, particularly in Norway, but why the debate is absent is not only a result of the close ties between the Norwegian bureaucracy and the civil society. There have to be other explanations. One explanation could be that there are still a lot of unsolved questions about what sort of initiative REDD will end up being. The

flux and fixity of the REDD-discourse or architecture creates a space of unity between all involved actors. They all have different dreams about the REDD-future but as long as the process is still evolving, these dreams can live side by side in a multifaceted initiative. This is also visible in the Norwegian context; the reason why Friends of the Earth Norway, WWF Norway, Rainforest Foundation Norway, Greenpeace Norway, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance , Jens Stoltenberg, Erik Solheim and the rest of the government and all political parties in the parliament (including The Progress Party) still see REDD as a good idea and initiative is because we are still in the vague and blurry birth of the initiative. The question is, how long the different actors can claim that we are still in this long lasting facilitating period for? And then we also have to ask ourselves: who will end up very disappointed and be the "loser" this time?

6.10 Why should REDD succeed where development has failed?

The implementation of REDD is confronted by many of the same challenges and obstacles as classical development interventions are and which it has not managed to confront for several of decades. Corruption, governance and rights related issues related to both property and indigenous people are just a few of many areas where REDD has to be a game changer to succeed. Ibrekk is worried about this and points out how every index, whether it is on democracy, governance or corruption, shows that the countries Norway is entering now are coloured dark red all over the map. The red colour indicates a high degree of corruption, lack of democracy, transparency and a lack of stable institutions etc. Countries such as Indonesia, Papua New-Guinea and DR Congo are among the most difficult areas to operate in and even Amazonia is often referred to as the green Sicily. "I do not think we have realized how difficult it is to actually

achieve game changing development in these kinds of countries", says Ibrekk. It is also important to mention that there is in general a relatively poor track record on how development aid actually can and has contributed to game changing institutional change.

Why then should REDD succeed where development aid never has succeeded. Inger Næss in KOS says there are two reasons why REDD has to be seen as something else than regular aid and therefore have a greater chance of success. The first reason is because it is performance based. That means that there, in phase three of the initiative, will not be transferred any money before the given country can prove that they have reduced their deforestation rate compared to a historically reference level [which will be adjusted over the years to come.] . This in turn will work as a safeguard so that money will only be disbursed it verified results are delivered. In the framework for implementing REDD+ there will be developed measures to monitor both reduced carbon emissions and the safeguards such as stakeholder participation, benefit sharing and anticorruption measures. . The other argument is that there, in the case of REDD, will be granted such a substantial amount of money that it will be a real alternative to the current deforestation activities and interesting for the Ministries of Finance in the cooperating countries. Hopefully this will lead to a substantial game change.

The question is then wheter this actually is something new? Will the amount of money have decisive significance for a potential REDD success? Have not decades of different development regimes, initiatives and projects proven once and for all that the transfer of money does not solve big political and structural challenges such as deforestation? It is doubtful that the large amounts of money put into this project make it a completely new way to think about development

aid. It is also doubtful how a performance-based system will change anything, and what will happen if someone does not deliver what he or she has promised. Who will then put force behind this performance-based system? Arild Angelsen argues at REDD-seminar that we also have to keep in mind that there exists a certain need, as with regular development aid, among the donors to get rid of the money as in any other aid transaction. A more theoretical element of this is how such a performance-based mechanism, with monitoring via satellites and laser technology, creates an enormous regime of control. In REDD's case it is the most remote areas of the world who, through this, get a new global connection of developmental and neoliberal control.

7. Why REDD will continue on

”This is the most important thing we do in the World. It is the largest thing Norway contributes to and it is the only element in the climate negotiations where something is happening”[41]

Jens Stoltenberg 25.05.2010

Prime Minister Stoltenberg was enthusiastic about REDD on the opening day at the Oslo Climate and Forest Conference 2010. This quote illustrates both how important REDD has become in international climate negotiations and how important it is for Norway to contribute in this area. The Climate and Forest Conference in Oslo is the latest manifestation of the Norwegian REDD-involvement. I started my discussion with an image of Soltenberg, Solheim and Carlos Minc in the Amazon and asked why they ended up there. I have tried to put together the history behind their stroll on the remote Amazonian path. This question can be expanded to ask why and where this stroll will continue. The Norwegian REDD-story is the story of an initiative that has been established in an extremely top-down and swift process. Many of my informants use good timing as an explanation of why the ‘letter from Lars and Lars’ became so influential. It was not the letter as such that made the tropical forest change in Norwegian climate policy, but rather it was all the simultaneous circumstances that were pointing in the same direction in 2007. Two influential reports (Stern and IPCC) had pointed to immediate action and anti-deforestation measures as one of the important target areas. The Stern Report was focusing on low hanging fruits on a tree of cost-efficiency. The Norwegian political leaders saw this fruit and saw the tree also as a tree of political realism. But this political realism was related to the Norwegian political landscape. The institution which knows the

[41] http://www.dagbladet.no/2010/05/26/nyheter/miljo/politikk/jens_stoltenberg/erik_solheim/11869214/

most and has expertise on what can be politically realistic in the involved recipients' countries was, after a while, put on the sideline and not directly involved in the project. NORAD, who I find has the most critical remarks and thoughts about the Norwegian REDD-initiative, has no direct day-to-day involvement with the Norwegian REDD-process. The secretariat (KOS) was placed in the Ministry of Environment and very few people with development – background were hired. This has nevertheless not made the people in KOS blind to the difficulties of implementation, they are aware of the challenges and clearly distance themselves from the political rhetoric used in particular by Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg about how cheap and easy this will be. They are nevertheless saying that REDD will be more politically realistic compared to measures Norway can take at home. And here we are approaching a key reason to why Stoltenberg changed his mind before Bali, why he was so seemingly happy on that Amazonian path and why he, in May 2010, invited the world to Oslo and was called "the king of the forest" by the Norwegian press. They realised that REDD could be the perfect compromise. A compromise not only in the Norwegian political landscape between environmentalists and political realists, but also a genuine compromise internationally where the climate challenge could be met with a tool that Norway already understood very well: the transfer of money from the Global North to the Global South through, in Norway's case, development aid. To use development aid created another win for the Norwegian policy makers who support a 1 percent goal in the Norwegian aid-budget. The win-win-win equation is then more accurate to apply in the Norwegian political context than perhaps in a tropical rainforest country. With REDD, Norway has moved a problem out of its original context and placed it where problems of the North often are solved: in the Global South. The Norwegian economy and Norwegian employment rates are not influenced - that would not be politically realistic. The people affected by REDD live in remote forest areas not equally attached to the global economy, and thus also in realms that are more cost-

efficient and politically realistic to target. What I have tried to say throughout this thesis, however, is that there are some issues not taken into account in these myths and narratives about how REDD can fix the climate challenge, save biodiversity and create sustainable development. There is a deeper critique that is interesting to investigate, and here we can make use of my theoretical framework to identify what ideas can be traced to be lying beneath the whole initiative.

I argued in chapter 4, drawing on the work of post-development thinkers, that an intervention such as REDD are not smooth and apolitical, but rather full of friction and very political. While Ferguson (1994, 2006) and Nustad (2003) see this phenomenon related to poverty and Sachs (1992) also includes the industrial exploitation of the environment, it is also appropriate to use the same method of reasoning when talking about deforestation, conservation and REDD. Liza Grandia (2007), writing about the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (MBC), mentions how these big internationally-funded conservation programmes use inclusive win-win rhetoric to satisfy all involved actors, but at the same time ignore "the obvious causal factors of extractive deforestation like oil drilling, cattle ranching, logging, export-plantation agriculture, inequities in land distribution, and many other market activities that primarily threaten protected areas in Central America". The interesting parallel is that the developers in the MBC-programme insist that the key cause of deforestation is that the nature's market value is not yet recognised.

In this lies some of the essence of what I wish to say. There is some sort of exclusion and a more or less deliberate obscuration of global developmental and environmental connections. Whether it is called global connections, messy encounters, global friction or power relations, all of these terms are in opposition

to the smooth idea about the global market, developmentalism and an idea that the commodification of nature is an unruffled and apolitical process. A process of veiling occurs when trees and carbon are transformed into tradable objects and entities. In this way, all the other aspects of this transaction are encapsulated inside trees and carbon and one can get the impression that the World has turned into an apolitical and smooth operating machine. By insisting on commodifying nature while ignoring the causal links between global capitalism and deforestation, the rainforests are delinked from the factual global encounters that are unfolding every day.

Despite this parallel, the REDD-discourse is in some ways significantly different from the more classical conservation interventions and therefore trickier to explain. Both because the actors involved in REDD understand it as different things and because history has not yet shown us what it will be, it is even difficult to single out what the REDD-discourse is. Where in the previous example it could be argued that simultaneity is not recognised, the REDD-discourse has clearly advocated for a global approach to the climate challenge. The climate challenge is in itself a global concern with global implications and solutions. It is therefore important for, among others, Norwegian policy makers to assure their audiences that we need a global approach to the challenge. This is why Norway, for example, invests in the development of cleaner technology in coal plants in China and tries to halt deforestation in tropical forest nations. In this manner of reasoning we find a global understanding of complex and interconnected challenges. What I nevertheless argue is that this global understanding is limited. 'Simultaneity' in the analysis *is* to some extent recognised when the climate challenge is being discussed. The climate challenge is seen as global in scope when there is a possibility for Norway to argue that it is reasonable to put efforts into cutting emissions from deforestation or in cleaning emissions from coal

power plants in China. But other global climate dimensions, are rarely part of the official analysis; for example, Norway's position as a petroleum economy with huge national interest in the global petroleum market. Norway is then performing some sort of schizophrenic exercise – denying and embracing a global vision at the same time.

As Anna Tsing (2005:88-89) states: "to 'think globally' is no easy task. To recognise the globe as a relevant unit for our imaginations requires work". Yet the Norwegian politicians in government and opposition try to do exactly this in their solutions to climate change. The reasoning is that the best efforts to halt the climate change takes place where it is most cost-effective. With arguments constructed around ideas about cost-efficiency combined with political realism, Norwegian policy makers are experts in global thinking. It doesn not matter where we put in our efforts, the climate threat is global, and solutions are therefore also found globally. This is why it is natural for Norway to find their climate measures outside Norwegian borders, whether they are implementing green technology at Chinese coal plants or anti-deforestation initiatives in Indonesia or Brazil. Norway is in this way moving the political challenges out of a Norwegian domestic context and takes action elsewhere where it is more politically realistic and cost efficient. In relation to REDD, it is possible to argue that REDD is, in a sense, a technical/economic fix on a grand scale – which thereby obscures the unequal relations between the global North and the global South.

Thus, it can be argued that thinking globally - and, at least implicitly, acknowledging 'simultaneity' - is kept within strict bounds by the Norwegian government; Norway's global impact is only recognised where Norway is

actually contributing to a global good. When Norwegian action has negative global impact, causal links are often ignored and not taken into account. If we look at the rainforest, this limited acknowledgement of 'simultaneity' may be exemplified by how the Norwegian Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, in one moment is called "the king of the forest"[42] because of his engagement in the REDD-initiative, and in the next is responsible both historically and as a current leader for the Government Pension Fund Norway which invests in companies such as Chevron, Samling and Wilmar International[43], all responsible for major deforestation and degradation activities. In addition, we have the inevitable fact that Norway is a major oil exporter

[42] http://nrk.no/nyheter/norge/1.7140837

[43] See for example: http://www.nbim.no/Global/Documents/Holdings/EQ_holdings_SPU_Sorted_09.pdf and http://www.regnskog.no/Nyheter/Nyhetsarkiv/Regnskogfondet/1619.cms

8. Concluding remarks

"In Copenhagen we discussed the effects of climate change; in Cochabamba we discussed the causes"

Evo Morales, May 2010[44]

I have in this thesis attempted to explain how the fundamental reasoning behind REDD neglects important perspectives. These are perspectives of simultaneity, perspectives on local complexities and perspectives on alternative pathways and strategies to sustainable development. REDD is attempting to give a top-down, technical and easy answer to what, in the end, is no less then a fundamental, if not civilizational, question of our time. Once more, the answer from the global North obscures alternative pathways to sustainability and the causal links behind climate change. Norway is a global business actor and earns money on environmental degradation whether it is tar-sand in Canada or gigantic gas-power plant and aluminum production in Qatar. During the spring of 2010, Norsk Hydro, a company partly owned by the Norwegian state and other Norwegians banks and corporations and Europe's third largest aluminum maker, signed a take over deal with the Brazilian company, Vale's, aluminum business. Norsk Hydro has a competitive advantage using Norwegian hydro electric power, but lacks the raw materials in aluminum production: bauxite. This need for raw materials has led the Norwegian company and thereby the Norwegian state into the world's third largest bauxite mine, Paragominas. Mining is an important driver behind deforestation and the Hydro involvement in Northern Brazil is thus only one small example of how Norway, a week before the much publicised Climate and Forest conference in Oslo, involves itself simultaneously in the world. By

[44] Quoted at a public meeting at the University of Oslo during Evo Morales' official visit to Norway in May 2010.

pushing a huge initiative like REDD as the most important solution to climate change, the causality in climate change is obscured. The driving force is that global capitalism is in need of resources, here exemplified by the Norwegian need for bauxite. This need creates new processes of global encounters and, as Anna Tsing (2005) argues, not without friction.

Acknowledgments

Writing this thesis has been a journey for me where many people have guided me and pointed in different but interesting directions. I will therefore take the opportunity to first of all thank my informants for cooperativeness. I am grateful for your flexibility and how you have managed to make space for me in an otherwise busy work schedule.

This thesis would not have been able to develop without support from my academic advisor, Professor Desmond McNeill. You have given me both freedom and crucial guidelines at every critical stage in the process. From the first meeting at your office in May 2009, to the final steps towards a final paper, you have given me confidence and a belief that I had to find my way to understand and write about REDD.

Karen Victoria Lykke Syse, had I met someone else in my confused period returning from Tanzania, it is far from certain that I would have ended up at Desmond's office that day. Thank you for seeing me, taking my confusion seriously and pointing me in the right direction.

The writing process was done at Centre for Development and Environment (Senter for Utvikling og Miljø – SUM), which has been a wonderfully stimulating place. First of all an appreciative thank you to Hal Wilhite and Hanna Ihlebæk at MILEN (Environmental Change and Sustainable Energy) for granting me a master scholarship and a unique opportunity to be part of the master student environment at SUM. I would also like to thank my fellow students both at the SUM master programme and on the second floor for stimulating discussions and important coffee breaks at Plaza. A special thanks to those of you who have helped me at different stages in the process: Nadja Raabs, Maren Olene Kloster,

Karine Risnes and Ida Søraunet Wangberg. I am also very grateful to my copy editor Terry-Jo Thorne.

I have several intellectual debts to repay. Mariel Aguilar Støen, you made me curious on looking beyond the obvious; Knut Nustad, you made me confident that I was on some sort of right track. Arild Vatn, Arild Angelsen, Sjur Kasa and Pål Vedeld, you were all pointing in different directions but that was exactly what I needed and you all revealed new important perspectives on REDD.

Also thanks to important people at the University College in both Bergen and Oslo and the University in Bergen for giving me new tools and opportunities to understand the world throughout the years. My academic journey has not been an obvious one and you have all made that possible for me.

This project would not be possible without support from my family and friends. Especially thanks to you mom, back home at Ask, for always believing in me, and to you Ingjerd for encouragement, support and showing me new perspectives and places in the world.

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